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Abstract
This paper presents a tool to detect the accumulation of risks in emerging market economies 
based on a synthetic index of “vulnerability” for three different types of crisis (sovereign, currency 
and banking crises). To build the index we fi rst use a signalling approach (Auroc) to preselect the 
variables that issue adequate signals before the blown up of a crisis. The short-term interbank 
rate is a leading indicator for the three different types of crises and short term external debt also 
plays a prominent role. These variables are then introduced in a logistic estimation to obtain 
the predicted probability of being in a “vulnerable” state for each type of crisis. These indexes, 
labelled SHERLOC, which stands for Signalling Heightened Emerging Risks that Lead to the 
Occurrence of Crises, outperform all best single indicators in terms of in-sample and out-of-
sample validation. Additionally, a synthetic index for each type of crisis seems to predict better 
“vulnerable” states than the use of an aggregate index for all types of crises. 
Keywords: emerging economies, crisis, vulnerabilities, early warning models, risks.
JEL classifi cation: E44, F01, F34, F37, G01.
Resumen
Este documento presenta una herramienta para detectar la acumulación de debilidades en las 
economías emergentes basada en un índice sintético de «vulnerabilidad» frente a tres tipos 
diferentes de crisis (crisis soberana, cambiaria y bancaria). Para construir el índice, primero 
nos centramos en un enfoque de señalización (Auroc) que nos permite preseleccionar las 
variables que emiten señales adecuadas antes de que estalle una crisis. El tipo de interés 
interbancario a corto plazo parece ser uno de los principales indicadores adelantados para 
los tres tipos de crisis, mientras que la deuda externa a corto plazo también desempeña 
un papel destacable. Estas variables preseleccionadas se incorporan en una estimación 
logística para obtener la probabilidad prevista de estar en un estado «vulnerable» frente a 
cada tipo de crisis. Estos índices, denominados SHERLOC, que es el acrónimo de Signalling 
Heightened Emerging Risks that Lead to the Occurrence of Crises (en español, señalización 
de riesgos crecientes en emergentes que conducen a la ocurrencia de crisis), ofrecen mejores 
rendimientos que los mejores indicadores individuales en términos de validación dentro y fuera 
de la muestra. Además, un índice sintético para cada tipo de crisis parece predecir mejor 
estados «vulnerables» que el uso de un índice agregado para todos los tipos de crisis.
Palabras clave: economías emergentes, crisis, vulnerabilidades, modelos de alerta temprana 
y riesgos.
Códigos JEL: E44, F01, F34, F37, G01.
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1 The acronym SHERLOC also reminds us the main use of the index, which could provide clues to detect the skeleton in the closet 
2 According to published earnings and profitability reports, some European banks obtained around half of their EBITDA in emerging economies.  
3 For more information on these crises, see Appendix 1.3. 
4 See Decision of the European Systemic Risk Board of 11 December 2015 on the assessment of materiality of third countries for the Union’s banking 
system in relation to the recognition and setting of countercyclical buffer rates (ESRB/2015/3) (2016/C 97/11). 
1 Introduction and motivation 
Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) have become increasingly relevant in the world economy, both in terms 
of trade and financial flows. Given that these economies have traditionally been more prone to suffer crises, early 
warning signals (EWS) models regain relevance in order to anticipate vulnerable states in EMEs that can affect global 
financial stability. In that sense, there are two key questions of research. First, could these stress episodes be 
anticipated sufficiently in advance to tame its global effects? Second, which variables should be prominently monitored 
to detect the accumulation of vulnerabilities in these economies? 
In this paper we try to answer both questions based on the large and growing literature on EWS. The 
contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it develops a quarterly dataset of sovereign, currency and banking crises, 
partially based on the seminal work of Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012 and 2018) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
Contrary to the rest of the literature, we define the beginning and the end of crises on a quarterly basis in order to 
develop a timely Early Warning model. Second, and more relevant, we propose a synthetic index of vulnerability for 
emerging economies, distinguishing by type of crisis (sovereign, banking and currency), which is labelled SHERLOC 
(Signalling Heightened Emerging Risks that Lead to the Occurrence of Crises)1. We show that a synthetic index for 
each type of crisis seems to outperform an aggregate index for all types of crises.  
Along with their greater presence in global markets both in trade and financial terms2, emerging economies 
have experienced a large number of currency, banking and sovereign crises with high costs in terms of economic 
activity and employment. There are well-known examples of such situations: Mexico in 1995, Asia in 1997, Russia in 
1998, or Argentina in 20013. In recent years, crises have been less frequent, partly due to the measures implemented 
by policymakers to avoid them, adopting floating exchange rate regimes and de-dollarizing public debt. But, in some 
cases, emerging economies have continued to face periods of heightened financial volatility, related either to their 
greater integration in trade and financial international flows or to domestic disequilibria. These stress periods resulted 
in increases in risk premia, declines in stock indexes and significant depreciations of their currencies, which in some 
cases also fed economic declines, as pointed out by the recent turbulences in Argentina and Turkey. 
Although most of these recent episodes reversed faster than in previous periods, it is essential to monitor the 
build-up of vulnerabilities in emerging economies. Firstly, it enables policy makers and domestic investors to assess 
the economic situation of these countries and the risks they might face. Secondly, in a more and more globalized 
world, risks derived from a higher integration in global financial markets are relevant and should be taken into 
consideration. Financial markets in emerging economies have substantially developed and therefore financial spillovers 
and spillbacks from emerging economies to advanced economies are becoming increasingly relevant (see IMF’s Global 
financial Stability Report, April 2016). Finally, a financial crisis in one of these countries can affect the financial stability 
of other economies through the positions of financial institutions and firms in EMEs. That is why, for instance, the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) established the possibility of imposing countercyclical capital buffers to 
European banks that are exposed to third countries with unaddressed risks4.  
In order to build the synthetic indexes to monitor EMEs vulnerabilities, we use a signalling approach (AUROC) 
to assess, in a univariate setting, the predictive ability of each indicator before the onset of a crisis, be it sovereign, 
currency or banking crisis and to select the variables that make up these new vulnerability indexes using a standard 
                                                                            
logit model. Other methodological approaches are also proposed to build the index, such as a factor augmented 
logistic estimation, a simple average of the risk percentiles or an aggregation of preselected variables based on 
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5 This approach can be complemented by the use of vulnerability dashboards (heat maps), which have been useful to detect vulnerabilities in the past, 
as decribed in Alonso, I. and Molina, L. (forthcoming), "A complementary approach to monitor risk in emerging economies: the vulnerability dashboard", 
Banco de España Ocassional Paper, forthcoming. 
principal component analysis (PCA). Finally, we also assess the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive ability of the 
respective SHERLOCs, using the methodology of Alessi and Detken (2011). Employing this evaluation method, we 
show that a synthetic index for each type of crisis outperforms (i) an aggregate index for all types of crises and (ii) the 
best single indicators for each crisis (mainly sovereign spreads and short-term interbank rate) in the sense that they 
increase the usefulness of the model. However, it is essential to bear in mind that the aim of these indexes is not to 
predict crises, but to identify underlying vulnerabilities and imminent tail risks that predispose a country to a crisis. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief literature review and discusses 
the main pitfalls of EWS methodology. Section 3 presents the main features of the dataset used in the econometric 
analysis. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy used in the paper, the results of the non-parametric and parametric 
approaches to detect vulnerabilities, and the construction and validation of the SHERLOCs. Section 5 concludes and 
highlights future work5. 
                                                                            
2 Literature review and dealing with EWS’ pitfalls 
There is a widespread and growing literature on early warning models, developed in the aftermath of the 
seminal paper of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). In its early stage, most of the literature on EWS focused on 
analysing EMEs’ risks, such as done by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006); Lestano and Kuper (2001) for Asian countries; 
and Kamin et al (2001) for Latin American countries. In the wake of the global financial crisis, most recent papers have 
focused on developed countries6 and assessing vulnerabilities that can affect countries’ financial stability7. Our work is 
partially based on this large strand of the literature to select the leading indicators of our analysis, considering all types 
of crises occurred over the period 1993-2018 in emerging markets. 
Nevertheless, a large number of theoretical and empirical papers have challenged the EWS methodology. 
First, on the empirical front, there are too few crisis observations to reach consistent logit estimators. This problem is 
even more acute when dealing with out-of-sample calibration of EWS, as the number of crisis observations dwarfs. In 
this paper, as the aim of the synthetic index of vulnerability is not to predict crises, but to identify underlying 
vulnerabilities, we use six quarters previous to a crisis, which partially mitigates the issue of lack of enough stress 
periods. Moreover, the use of random effects in the logistic estimation allows us to exploit the information of all the 
countries in the sample, even those with no crisis observations.8 
Second, there could be a problem of “real time” EWS. This means that the authorities and economic modellers 
do not have the entire set of information used by a posteriori estimations9. The need to build real time indicators is a 
time consuming task in macro samples with heterogeneous countries and the use of a common lag of publication for 
all countries could bias the results10. In this analysis, the aggregate indexes are constructed in real time each time the 
exercise is updated. While in the baseline model we decide to keep the model as simple as possible discarding “the 
real-time issue”, we carry out a validation exercise using a pseudo-real time approach, whose results can be found in 
the appendix V. Our results are mostly robust to this specification. 
6 Rose and Spiegel (2012) and Frankel and Saravelos (2012) propose different methodologies to determine the drivers of the global financial crisis using 
a cross-country approach. Catao and Milesi-Ferreti (2014) highlight the role of foreign liabities to explain external crises in advanced economies. 
7 Oet et al (2013), Gramlich et al (2010) and Castro et al (2016) develop EWS for systemic risk to implement macroprudential tools. 
8 Another way to avoid this problem would be to build a kind of sole country in which crises and variables will be placed consecutively, as explained in 
Gadea and Pérez Quirós (2012).However, this is appropiate when the degree of homogeneity when a shock occurs is higher than the homogeneity 
within countries, and this is probably not the case in our sample.  
9 At time t they only have information on GDP in t-1, on NEER on t, on Doing Business indicators at time t-4 and so on. 
10 Another additional problem is what we would labell as “true real time”, that is, to rigorously calibrate an EWS we should use the data that were actually 
published at the time of the calibration, which are usually revised later, especially those referred to activity and the public sector balances. In our case, 
we do not have the vintages to carry out true real-time EWS.  
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Third, EWS may present a post-crisis bias of discrete dependent variables as macro variables tend to be very 
persistent and therefore some indicators show an “erratic behaviour” in the recovery phase. Bussiere and Fratzscher 
(2006) predict financial crises in EMEs by relying on a multinominal logit model, which allows to distinguish between 
three states: a normal, pre-crisis, and post-crisis state. In our case, we show that considering the “post-crisis” bias, 
by eliminating the data of four quarters after a crisis, is relevant to slightly reduce type II errors (false alarms) out-of-
sample, but it does not seem to affect the ratio of crisis predicted in-sample.  
Fourth, these EWS models might also suffer from a problem of prediction failures outside the sample that 
could be partially attributed to an in-sample overfitting and variable selection bias. As many combinations of different 
variables could lead to the same prediction, the final selection of variables can be arbitrary, which leads to data mining 
or cherry picking issues. A way to circumvent those pitfalls can be related to the use of automated variable selection 
methods like the Lasso11 or out-of-sample validation methodologies like the Random Forest12, which basically rely on 
the statistical improvement of the results to decide whether a concrete indicator is included or not in the model. In this 
paper we deal mainly with the overfitting issue in a simpler way than Lasso or random forest models. First, we use a 
signalling approach (Auroc) to preselect the variables that issue the best signals ahead of a crisis13, and then use these 
variables to build the vulnerability indexes SHERLOC, via a panel logit model14 -estimating the predicted probability of 
being in a state of vulnerability-, a factor augmented logit model, or simplifying them via principal component analysis 
techniques15. These two methodologies have been broadly used by the literature (Bruggemann et al (2000), Edison 
(2003), Frankel and Rose (1996) and Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013)), but as far as we know these papers do not provide 
a clear framework to preselect variables as we do. 
The main contribution to the literature of this paper is twofold: 1) we develop a quarterly dataset of events, 
distinguishing by type of crisis, and 2), we propose a synthetic index of vulnerability for EMEs. First, one of the most 
relevant issues of early warning models is how to define stress events. There are two main ways to define them. One 
can rely on a binary indicator to define periods of crisis. This approach has several advantages. First, it is more flexible 
since you can easily define “vulnerable states” as pre-crisis periods as we do in this paper. Second, we are able to 
distinguish between different types of crises. While most papers rely on the seminal work of Laeven and Valencia 
(2008, 2012 and 2018), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) or Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), we contribute to the literature 
by developing a quarterly dataset of sovereign, banking and currency crises, partially based on Laeven and Valencia 
(2008, 2012) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), for 25 emerging economies in order to get a timely early warning system 
model. This approach faces some limitations since an exogenous definition of crisis can be subject to expert judgment 
and misclassification, and needs to deal with the “post-crisis” bias, as we do as a robustness check. Moreover, it 
requires a sufficient number of stress periods to get robust results. That is why some papers rely on the use of 
continuous variables, such as Financial Stability Indexes (FSI) or Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) (Eichengreen (1995, 
1996) and lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) and let the model endogenously choose the periods of crisis through the use 
of Markov Switching Models (Peria (2002)). However, in our case it is difficult to follow this strategy due to the lack of 
continuous variables long enough for our sample of EMES countries. For instance, we could use FSI measures, such 
as the ones developed by Berganza and Molina (forthcoming), but at the cost of fewer observations since most of 
11The Lasso (Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator) technique was introduced in order to improve the prediction accuracy and interpretability 
of least square regression models by altering the model fitting process to select only a subset of the provided covariates. It forces the sum of the 
absolute value of the regression coefficients to be less than a fixed value, which leads to certain coefficients to be set to zero, effectively leading to a 
simpler model. After repeating the estimation, variables that are retained most often are selected. See Tibshirani, R. (1997). 
12The random forest methodology operates by constructing a multitude of “decision” trees and outputting the class that is the mode of the classes 
(classification) or mean prediction (regression) of the individual trees. In the case of EWS, it could consist of selecting the regressor based on their relative 
importance, that is, on the relative increase of the accuracy of the prediction once the concrete variable is included. See Breiman (2001). 
13The signalling approach was initially developed by Kaminsky et al (1998) to identify macroeconomic variables that can anticipate currency crises based 
on a “critical threshold” calculated by minimising the noise-to-signal ratio for each indicator. But, it does not consider the interrelationships between 
variables. 
14One of the earliest contributions was from Frankel and Rose (1996) who study the determinants of currency crashes in 100 emerging economies from 
1971 to 1992. Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) also develop a framework for predicting systemic events, which incorporate both domestic and global 
indicators that improve the forecast performance of the model. 
15Many variables are introduced in the regression in levels, although some of them (typically stocks variables like credit to GDP or those related to debt) 
could have a trend that could bias their accuracy as crises’ predictors. In some cases we have introduced first time differences to avoid this problem. 
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Usefulness, which compares the loss of the model with regards to the loss of disregarding the model, taking into 
account policy maker’s preference. While the in-sample performance is quite adequate, in line with the results of Alessi 
and Detken (2011), the out-of-sample performance is poorer, as in other out of sample validations. Moreover, one 
needs to be aware of some of the criticisms that still hold. First, noise (excessive issuance of signals) remains high. 
Second, we are not able to capture non-linearities as pointed out by Eichengreen (2002). Third, even if the use of 
different types of crises for each country partially mitigates the criticism of “this time is different” and the out-of-sample 
performance suggests that “not every time is different”, a new type of crisis anticipated by other variables can always 
appear without been detected by the SHERLOC.  
them start after 2000 for emerging economies. Moreover, it is debatable which indicator to use in order to capture all 
the stress events that we are interested in. 
Second, we propose a synthetic index of vulnerability for EMEs. Few papers have proposed a synthetic index 
of vulnerabilities for emerging economies. One of the most recent is the index of vulnerability for emerging economies 
proposed by Lepers and Sánchez-Serrano (2017). Contrary to our paper, they only focus on financial crises and do 
not evaluate the performance of their composite index. In this sense, our focus will be on all the crises occurred over 
the period 1993-2018 in emerging markets in order to exploit the heterogeneity of different types of crises. Additionally, 
we incorporate a widespread evaluation method, developed by Alessi and Detken (2011), to assess the predictive 
ability of the SHERLOC both in sample and out-of sample. Alessi and Detken (2011) propose a new measure of 
16 The update was made before the publication of Laeven and Valencia (2018). That is why there are slight differences. For instance, we consider a 
banking crisis in Russia in 2015 that is not included in LV (2018). 
17 However, in our dataset, we decide not to truncate the end of banking crises. Laeven and Valencia truncate banking crises 5 years after the blown 
up. 
18 As events are defined in a different way (banking and sovereign are proxied by events while currency by a quantitative threshold), there is a wide 
heterogeneity in terms of frequency and duration of crises. Indeed, currency crises tend to be more frequent but with a shorter duration. We have 
discarded the definition of a currency crisis as a change in the exchange rate regime as since the mid 00s almost all countries in our sample have 
adopted freely floating regimes.  
The first step of EWS models consists of identifying the relevant periods of crisis in the 25 emerging economies 
analysed. The definition of crisis is crucial in EWS and needs a thorough analysis to avoid misclassification issues and 
uncertainty.The identification of stress events are used in order to proxy “vulnerable states” in the econometric analysis, 
defined as the six quarters previous to the crisis.  
One of the contributions of this paper is the construction of a quarterly dataset of stress events, distinguishing 
between sovereign, banking and currency crisis. To do so, we mainly identify sovereign and banking crises following 
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012), but defining the beginning and the end on a quarterly basis instead of an annual 
frequency, and updating the dataset until the end of 201816. The beginning of a sovereign crisis is defined as the 
quarter in which the sovereign defaults or restructures its debt according to S&P while the end of a sovereign crisis is 
associated with the quarter in which an agreement with debt holders is reached, or alternatively, the date of the debt 
exchange, which implies a partial reaccess of the sovereign to international markets. For banking crises, we date the 
quarter of the start of the stress using national authorities’ information or IMF’s reports. Banking stress are determined 
when there are significant signs of financial stress in the banking system and banking policy interventions. The end 
date of the crisis is assigned to the quarter in which the eighth consecutive quarter of growth of both real GDP and 
real credit is reached, which is the criteria used by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012 and 2018)17. Finally, for currency 
crises we rely on a definition similar to that of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) though with a more restrictive percentage. A 
crisis is assigned when a quarterly depreciation of the exchange rate against the US dollar is above 30%18. As a 
                                                                            
3 Data 
3.1  Building an Early Warning System: Stress events 
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19 Note that these numbers do not correspond exactly with the number of countries in crisis as one country could suffer from two or even three types 
of crisis at the same time. 
20 This avoid us to conduct a concrete analysis of the determinants of twin crises. Therefore, the possible bias arising from the presence of twin crises 
does not seem to be too problematic. It is worth noting that the currency crises in Argentina in 2001 takes place a quarter after the sovereign and 
banking crises. 
robustness check, we also define a currency crisis as a depreciation of at least 15% on a quarterly basis as long as 
this depreciation exceeds the average variation of the exchange rate plus a standard deviation (see table A1.3 Annex 
1 for a detailed description of the dates of crises). 
Once the crisis events are identified on a quarterly basis, we construct three dummies, one for each type of 
crisis, that are used in the econometric approach. Chart 1 plots the number of crisis identified per quarter19. As 
expected, the number of crisis diminished dramatically since 2004. Sovereign and currency crises are less frequent 
than in the nineties since many countries of the sample that used to rely on a fixed exchange rate to the USD as the 
main tool to stabilize domestic inflation have now turned to interest rates with floating exchange rates. Finally the 
percentage of banking crises in terms of total crises has increased after 2008. Chart 2 presents the exact number of 
crises in our sample, distinguishing between currency, sovereign and banking crises. As shown in Chart 2, in our 
dataset, there are only a twin sovereign-banking crisis (Argentina 2001 q4), a twin currency-banking crisis (Indonesia 
1997 q4) and a triple crisis (Russia 1998 q3)20. 
                                                                            
 
Chart 1
Number of countries with at least one type of crisis by quarter
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Our dataset includes 25 countries, representing around 78% of the GDP of developing economies, and 
around 45% of world GDP. It comprises 9 Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, 
 As the objective of EWS is to anticipate the appearance of crises with enough time to enable authorities to 
react, indicators should send a correct signal in advance of the stress periods identified. Considering the type of crisis 
we are dealing with, we use an evaluation window up to 6 quarters prior to the event (consistent with the results of 
Kaminsky et al (2000) who stated that warnings of a crisis usually appear 10 to 18 months before the outset). This 
means that the dummy identifies the one and a half year period before the crisis as the period in which indicators 
should send correct signals and the Auroc approach assesses the relevance and performance of each variable over 
this period21. Crisis years are not taken into consideration as our objective is to identify leading indicators, and indicators 
tend to have an erratic behaviour during periods of stress. The rest of years are considered normal or tranquil periods 
and therefore are equal to zero. 
3.2  Data for the econometric approach 
21 In pratical terms this implies that the dummies are defined with a 1 six quarters before the onset of the crisis, with missing values during the crisis, 
and zero in tranquil no pre-crisis times. Four and eight quarters are also considered as robustness checks (see Appendix III).  
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22 See Luis Molina, Esther López, Enrique Alberola, 2016. "An index of external positioning for the Spanish economy," Occasional Papers 1602, Banco 
de España 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Uruguay), 5 developing Asian nations (China, South Korea, India, Indonesia and Thailand), 6 
Eastern Europe countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Turkey) and 5 countries from Africa 
and the Middle East (South Africa, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Morocco). The selection of countries is determined 
by the availability of data, which can be easily updated, and also by their stronger commercial and financial ties with 
Spain22. 
Table 1 reports the 35 vulnerability indicators used in this paper. Their election is mainly based on the most 
significant variables suggested by the literature on EWS. Notice, however, that we include a large number of variables 
related to the banking sector, in order to reflect the fact that banking crises have become more relevant for advanced 
economies in the 21st century. In addition, most indicators are easy to update and allow a frequent monitoring of the 
risks faced by the countries in the sample. Moreover, we use both national and international sources in order to be 
able to extend the dataset back to the first quarter of 1993. This enables us to include some of the most relevant 
idiosyncratic crises (Mexico, Asia or Russia in the 90s). 
The 35 variables are divided into four groups, mainly reflecting the frequency of update, and their presumed 
capacity to react to an increase in risks. Financial markets variables –updated daily- are supposed to react more 
quickly to situations of high vulnerability, and even an overshooting of them could trigger a crisis. Fundamental variables 
–montly or quarterly updated- tend to reflect the increase in risks more parsimoniously and constitute the core of the 
econometric analysis. Finally crises coming from a deterioration of the institutional quality –whose indicators are 
updated annually- tend to have a longer ripening process, and their transmission channels differ from those of 
macroeconomic variables. For instance, a worsening of the institutional framework can deter foreign and internal 
investment and it can lead to sudden stops or capital flights even if fundamental variables are in good shape. The 
wilingness of governments to pay back their external debt is also a relevant factor, which should be monitored23. 
Finally, some variables have been included in the estimation strategy either to proxy contagion -both from a global 
turbulence or from EME’s interconnectedness and EME’s dependence on global commodity prices- and to control for 
global factors that could bias the results.  
                                                                            
23 Most of the data used is comparable since they are extracted from international or official national statistical sources. However, there remain 
differences, for instance with the definition of reserves which in some cases include reserves that cannot be mobilized by the monetary authority. 
24 Some of them are the BICRA indicators (Standard and Poor’s), banking and political risks scores (EIU), or Doing Bussiness and Absence of Violence 
(World Bank). All of them are introduced in the vulnerability dashborads described in Alonso and Molina (2020 forthcoming) 
For the econometric analysis all the indicators are transformed into a quarterly frequency, using either the last 
data of the corresponding quarter or the quarterly average (from lower to quarterly frequency) or a linear interpolation 
(from annual to quarterly frequency). Moreover, the lack of time series large enough leads us to discard many relevant 
qualitative variables24.
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Table 1
FINANCIAL MARKETS
* Sovereign spread (bps level)
* Sovereign spread (change over 3 months)
* Stock Exchange index (change over 3 months)
* Exchange rate vis a vis the USD (change over 3 months)
MACROECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS
REAL SECTOR: BANKING SECTOR:
* GDP (change y-o-y) * Real credit to private sector (y-o-y)
* Inflation rate * Real deposits on domestic banks (y-o-y)
* Industrial production (12 month MA, y-o-y) * Loan to Deposit ratio
* NEER overappreciation * Non performing loans (% total loans)
* Net foreign assets of domestic banks (% GDP)
FISCAL SECTOR: * Bank Stock Exchange (change over 3 months)
* Public sector balance (% GDP) * Spread of bank's external debt (3 months change)
* Public sector gross debt (% GDP) * Short term interbank rate (%)
* Intermediation margin (loan rate - deposit rate)
EXTERNAL SECTOR:
* Current account balance (% GDP)
* Gross external debt (% GDP)
* FDI (% GDP)
* Short term external debt (% Reserves)
* Reserves (% GDP)
* External debt service (% exports)
* Portfolio gross inflows (% GDP)
WEALTH AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY CONTAGION RISKS
* VIX
* Per capita GDP (USD PPP and % change) *10 year US Treasury bond yield
* GPR index * Short term interest rate
* Sovereign rating (average of the 3 agencies) * Trade links 
* EMBI sovereign spread
* Oil prices
Variables included in the AUROC exercise, mainly taken from the previous EWS literature
4 Empirical analysis 
In order to minimize “data mining” issues, we preselect the best leading indicators by 
using a signalling approach (the AUROC), and then used these variables in a logistic estimation 
to get the predicted probability of being in a “vulnerable” state. 
4.1 Signalling approach: AUROC results 
 
The AUROC (Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristics) approach is a 
univariate setting that measure the performance of each variable to distinguish between two 
distributions (in this case normal and stress periods). More specifically, it extracts signals from 
each indicator when it is above or below a certain threshold calculated with its historical data25. 
Based on these signals, the procedure estimates the performance of each variable depending 
on the number of correct signals (right guess of a crisis happening or not happening) and false 
signals (missed crises or predicted crises not happening) issued in the predetermined 
evaluation window. The Auroc evaluates each indicator performance taking into consideration 
the true positive rates in terms of the false positive rates. A value of 1 implies that the specific 
indicator is only issuing correct signals, whereas a value of 0.5 provides no information at all 
since it would anticipate crises randomly (like flipping a coin).  
                                                                            
25 See, for instance, Castro, Estrada and Martínez (2016) for an application to the case of the financial sector in Spain. 
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More specifically, the AUROC methodology indicates how well the model is able to 
distinguish between the probabilities of being in a vulnerable state or in a normal period. Indeed, 
as the threshold imposed to differentiate between stress and normal time increases, the ratio 
of true positive rate and false positive rate declines. An AUROC equals to 0.5 implies that there 
is an overlap between the distributions of crisis and normal times (Chart 3).  
Chart 3
The AUROC estimates the performance of each indicator depending on the ratio of true positive rate in terms of false positive rates.  An Auroc
 equal to 0.5 (worthless) cannot distinguish between the distributions of normal  times and stress periods. The higher the AUROC, the better.
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In technical words the AUROC estimates the area under the curves ROC (Receiver 
Operating Characteristics), which show the relation between the true positive rate and false 
positive rate for different thresholds: 
ܣܷܴܱܥ ൌන ܴܱܥሺܨܲሻ݀ܨܲ
ଵ
଴
 
to evaluate the predictive ability of each variable as an early indicator of a crisis. FP 
stands for false positive rate. It is worth mentioning that the AUROC model used assumes that 
policy makers preferences are equally concerned about type I (missing crises) and type II (false 
positives) errors26. 
The results for the signalling approach are presented in Table 227. The variables that 
seem to send strong signals to detect an increase in vulnerabilities are marked in red and in 
orange, indicating a percentage of good signals above 70% and 65%, respectively. 
The most outstanding result would be that, in the case of the anticipation of any kind 
of crisis, only a few variables reach an adequate performance, in terms of the ratio of true 
positive rates and false positive rates (just 6 out of 48). Moreover, only half of them come from 
the so-called “fundamental” indicators (the rate of inflation, the short-term interest rate, and the 
ratio of short term external debt to reserves), together with another variable reflecting market 
sentiment (the sovereign spread) and contagion from global turbulences (the US 10 year interest 
rate). As for the “qualitative” variables, just the sovereign rating seems to issue right signals in 
an adequate proportion. These apparently disappointing results could be due to the double 
26 Nevertheless other AUROC specifications could give more weigth to any of the error type (pseudo AUROC). 
27 Each variable has been transformed so an increase implies greater risks. 
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heterogeneity of our sample, on account of the diverse geographical composition and the 
different nature of crises. In addition, there seems to be a structural break around 2006 as the 
number of crises sunk to zero and then a new type of crisis emerge in 2007 (mainly contagion 
Table 2
Variable All crises Banking Sovereign Currency Latin America East. Eur. Asia Other EMEs Before 2007Q1 After 2007q1
Sov.spread 0.73 0.59 0.90 0.80 0.77 0.64 0.18 0.83 0.68 0.77
GDP growth 0.60 0.53 0.83 0.67 0.67 0.58 0.35 0.57 0.60 0.63
Inflation rate 0.74 0.64 0.68 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.68 0.79 0.64 0.86
NEER deviation from mean trend 0.59 0.68 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.49 0.72 0.62 0.63 0.55
Public sector balance 0.56 0.39 0.57 0.66 0.70 0.56 0.26 0.57 0.53 0.64
Public debt (first diff) 0.62 0.57 0.74 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.41 0.77 0.64 0.63
Net Foreign Assets dom.banks 0.59 0.68 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.65 0.57 0.66 0.51
Loan to Deposit ratio 0.54 0.71 0.62 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.93 0.40 0.71 0.31
Short term interbank rate 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.75 0.69 0.73 0.91 0.73 0.75 0.69
External debt 0.47 0.52 0.73 0.47 0.50 0.30 0.58 0.18 0.50 0.43
Short term ext.debt 0.67 0.66 0.87 0.71 0.72 0.56 0.82 0.25 0.70 0.62
Reserves over GDP 0.64 0.54 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.61 0.76 0.64 0.56 0.70
Ext.debt service 0.57 0.58 0.74 0.58 0.65 0.42 0.52 0.30 0.60 0.52
Portfolio inflows tail2-decline 0.48 0.38 0.67 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.62 0.39 0.57
GDP per capita (change) 0.60 0.50 0.84 0.68 0.68 0.55 0.41 0.58 0.59 0.63
Sov.rating 0.65 0.51 0.88 0.73 0.74 0.55 0.34 0.92 0.52 0.79
US 10Y treasury bond rate 0.65 0.78 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.76 0.92 0.30 0.73 0.56
US 3M interbank rate 0.62 0.75 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.73 0.85 0.41 0.64 0.53
Int. Trade interconectedness 0.53 0.45 0.72 0.57 0.53 0.60 0.17 0.74 0.49 0.62
AUROC results: percentage of good signals issued 6 quarters before the onset of each type of crisis. Red bolded cells indicate an AUROC above 70% and orange
bolded cells an AUROC above 65%. This table only shows the significant variables.
By type of crisis By region By time
from advanced economies turbulences and banking crises), which can have affected the type 
of variables that  issue anticipatory signals. For all these reasons, the exercise has been carried 
out distinguishing between banking, currency and sovereign crises. Moreover, we estimate 
another Auroc splitting the sample into EME regions, and before and after the third quarter of 
2006. 
Results for banking crises seem to be coherent with the theoretical background. The 
net foreign position of domestic banks (a proxy for an “excessive” reliance on external funding 
and for balance sheet currency mismatches) and the loan to deposit ratio (which again proxies 
a higher reliance on market funding instead of traditional funding) have a ratio of true positive 
signals close to 70%, as well as the NEER deviation from trend, which could proxy strains in 
banks’ borrowers. Moreover, two variables representing the cost of external funding and 
external financial conditions -short and long term interest rates in the US-, tend also to 
anticipate EMEs banking crises, as well as short term domestic rate increases. Finally, non-
performing loans have a noise to signal ratio of around 62%28.  
In the case of sovereign crises there are a large number of variables issuing adequate 
signals (17 out of 48 show a percentage of right signals above 65%, 12 of which have a 
percentage above 70%). Sovereign ratings and the sovereign spread deteriorates in anticipation 
to a public debt default. Moreover, activity growth variables deteriorates before a sovereign 
crisis, which can be a proxy for tax base shrinkages. On the fiscal side, relevant variables seem 
to be the level and increase of public debt instead of the public sector balance. As a large part 
of public debt of those countries were placed abroad, variables related to the level of external 
debt, such as maturity and debt service, are also leading indicators. In this sense, short term 
domestic rate also presents a ratio of good signals above 70%, probably as it is influenced by 
monetary authorities to limit capital outflows that could lead to a depreciation of the currency. 
As reserves constitutes the last line of defence in case of strains derived from its external debt, 
                                                                            
28 For our two tail risk variables we have presented the result of an increase in real credit growth and huge portfolio inflows. 
Nevertheless, the results for the other tail risk (that could detect the appearance of domestic credit bubbles financed in 
part with foreign short term capital) are also non-significant (38% and 41% of good signals, respectively).  
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their level is also relevant to anticipate sovereign crises. Finally, the variable that measures the 
interconnectedness of EMEs –trade links- also seems to be significant.  
Currency crises seem to be anticipated by an increase in sovereign spreads and short 
term interbank rates, as well as by short term external debt and an acceleration of public debt. 
A decrease in reserves and a fall in activity growth are also relevant. Surprisingly the 
overvaluation of NEER does not issue right signals (58%), although the inflation rate could proxy 
the loss of competitiveness in fixed exchange rate regimes like those of the 90s. Auroc results 
also point to a high correlation between currency and sovereign crises, as they share some 
common determinants, though with a slightly higher AUROC ratio for public debt, sovereign 
rating and spreads and reserves in the latter. As predicted by first generation currency crisis 
models, an increase in public deficit and public debt can lead to a sudden stop of capital inflows 
and a strong depreciation of the currency, which ultimately can derive in a sovereign default, as 
a large part of public debt is denominated in foreign currency and hold by external investors.  
Turning to the analysis by region, Latin American crises seem to be well anticipated by 
a deterioration of public sector balance, an increase of short-term external debt and its service, 
a decrease of international reserves and a deterioration of the macro environment (higher 
inflation and lower activity growth). These factors seem to fit well first generation currency crisis 
29 Latin America registered 29 crises from 1993q1 to 2018q4, of which 16 were currency crises (8 of them before 2006q4).  
30 Eastern European countries present by far the large number of banking crises on the sample, around 142 quarters, that 
is, 24 quarters by each country.  
31 Almost all crises for this group of countries are banking or currency crises, and all are dated back before 2000q1. 
32 The five countries included in this cluster are probably the most heterogeneous of the sample, and for example the 
standard deviation of GDP growth and of GDP per capita is the highest of the four groups. Moreover the number of missing 
values is also the highest (almost 10% of the total possible data).  
33 For the sake of robustness, we have build SHERLOCs using the regional results, but out of sample validation is much 
poorer.  
models29. For Eastern European countries, banking sector variables (a fall in real credit and 
deposits growth and an increase of short term interest rate) tend to better anticipate the 
outbreak of crises, along with two global variables and total reserves30. Developing Asian crises 
are correctly signalled by both banking sector variables (those related to currency mismatches 
as the net foreign position of domestic banks; or those referred to an excessive leverage in 
financial markets like the loan to deposit ratio)) and external disequilibria variables (current 
account balance, reserves)31. For the five remaining emerging countries (Rest of EMEs), the 
picture is much less clear, global and financial market variables, an aggregate evaluation of the 
economies (sovereign rating) or some variables reflecting the macro environment (public sector 
accounts, reserves and inflation rate) issue good signals32. 
Finally, as mentioned above, from 2006q3 to 2008q2 none of the countries in our 
sample suffered any kind of crisis. Splitting the sample before and after 2007q1 implies that 
after 2007 the inflation rate, the sovereign rating and the level of international reserves gain 
predictive power. The short term interbank rate remains one of the best predictors for any kind 
of crisis 
Summing up, the heterogeneous nature of our sample leads us to divide the dummy 
by type of crisis instead of just using a dummy for all crises or splitting the sample by region, 
so that the results could improve substantially33. According to the parametric exercise, the short 
term domestic rate tends to correctly anticipate vulnerable states, especially those related to 
the banking ones. Public sector disequilibria, both at the domestic and the external side, are 
relevant to determine the pre-crisis state that could lead to sovereign crises, which seem to be 
highly correlated with currency crises. Finally, variables measuring the deterioration of debt 
stocks, rather than flow variables seem to be more useful to anticipate stress periods. 
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4.2 Building the SHERLOC 
 
Once the variables have been preselected using a signalling approach (AUROC above 
65%), we propose four different methodologies to aggregate the relevant variables and build 
the SHERLOC. First, we estimate the predicted probability of being in a pre-crisis (or vulnerable) 
state (six quarters previous to the crisis) based on a logistic estimation. Second, the predicted 
probability is estimated from a factor-augmented logit approach. Third we calculate an index 
using the two first principal components of the set of (preselected) standardized variables. 
Fourth, we just calculate the mean of the risk percentiles of the relevant variables. Then, we 
validate these four approaches both in-sample and out-of-sample to select the most 
appropriate model to anticipate vulnerable countries.  
4.2.1 SHERLOC 1.0: LOGISTIC ESTIMATION 
The first methodology consists of extracting the predicted probability of being in a 
vulnerable state using a logistic estimation. The panel logit approach estimates the probability 
of being in a “vulnerable state” (i.e, six quarters prior to the crisis), which is assumed to follow 
a logistic distribution that depends on risk factors, that is: 
൫ ௜ܻ௧ǡ ൌ ͳȁ ௜ܺǡ௧ǡ ߚ൯ ൌ 
݁ቀఈା௑೔ǡ೟ ఉ
ᇲ ାఌቁ
ͳ ൅ ݁ቀఈା௑೔ǡ೟ ఉ
ᇲ ାఌቁ
 
 
where ௜ܻ௧ is the period of vulnerability t (six quarters) prior to a crisis in country i. As already 
mentioned, in the baseline specification, we use an evaluation window up to six quarters before 
the crisis and distinguish between a sovereign, currency and a banking crisis. ௜ܺǡ௧ stands for 
the factors that signal a vulnerable state according to the AUROC approach. In order to deal 
with multicollinearity issues, we exclude some of the AUROC preselected variables that are 
highly correlated (i.e. GDP growth and GDP per capita, or reserves in USD billion and reserves 
over GDP).  
Individual (country) effects are incorporated into the model by using random effects, 
which assume that the country effects have a distribution34. The choice of random effects has 
several advantages. First, it represents a more efficient combination of “within” and “between 
information”. Second, it enables us to exploit the information of all the countries in the sample, 
even those which have not suffered any type of crisis. On the contrary, in the case of using a 
fixed effect model, which is a Conditional Logit model, it eliminates the countries that have never 
faced a crisis. Understanding why some countries have never suffered a crisis is also relevant 
in our analysis. However, in order to use a random effect model, one needs to assume that the 
individual effects are not correlated with the independent variables35. As a robustness check, 
we also estimate the logit using pooled data (See Appendix IX) 
34 While in the fixed effects, it is assumed to be fixed. 
35 The fixed effect model is also better at minimising the “omitted variable” bias. 
                                                                            
In general the results of this multivariate analisys are coherent with those of the 
univariate (AUROC) estimations. For banking crises, the most relevant factors to explain a pre-
crisis state are the proxy for global financial conditions (US long term interest rate) and the loan 
to deposit ratio, which points to an excessive leverage of domestic banks. Both are closely 
related with the results for net foreign assets of domestic banks. Finally, the negative sign of 
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Table 3
VARIABLES Banking Sovereign Currency Crises (any kind)
GDP growth -0.206*** 0.012 -0.014
[0.056] [0.024] [0.023]
Inflation rate -0.031*** -0.003 0.000
[0.008] [0.004] [0.006]
NEER deviation from trend 0.028***
[0.006]
Public debt (first difference) 0.057 0.058***
[0.053] [0.086]
Public sector balance -0.311*** -0.143***
[0.044] [0.036]
Net Foreign assets dom banks -0.038***
[0.007]
Loan to Deposit ratio 0.693***
[0.243]
Short-term interbank rate 0.026*** 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.059***
[0.010] [0.022] [0.009] [0.010]
External debt 0.038**
[0.018]
Short-term external debt -0.001 -0.035 0.034*** 0.010
[0.002] [0.031] [0.011] [0.007]
Reserves (mm USD) -0.152*** -0.006*** -0.004***
[0.038] [0.002] [0.001]
Ext.debt service -0.002 0.011**
[0.009] [0.004]
Foreign Direct Investment -0.212***
[0.061]
Rating -0.217 0.209*** 0.194***
[0.138] [0.068] [0.066]
US 10 Y interest rate 0.689***
[0.166]
US 3 M interest rate 0.153
[0.109]
Trade links 0.237***
[0.082]
Observations 2197 2270 2407 2014
Number of id 25 25 25 25
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results of a logistic estimation using as regressors the variables with the highest AUROC
Results of the logistic estimation36 are posted on Table 3:  
36 All the logistic regressions in this section use a random effects model with standard errors derived from asymptotic 
theory (OIM) and include a constant term. The use of random effects is validated by a standard Hausmann test.  
the inflation rate can be explained by the fact that, in high inflation environments, banks have 
an advantage over their clients in the management of their assets and liabilities, for example 
lending at variable rates and taking deposits at fixed rates or longer maturities. For sovereign 
                                                                            
crises, a drop in activity and international reserves, an increase in short term domestic rates or 
external debt are highly relevant, as well as the trade links between EMEs. As in the AUROC 
approach, currency crises are closely related with sovereign crises, although in this case flows 
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(public sector balance) also play a role37,38. The results for any kind of crisis summarize 
fundamentally those obtained for sovereign and currency crises, and add the most stable 
capital inflows, foreign direct investment, with the expected sign. 
 SHERLOC 1.0 is then calculated as the predicted probability of being in a pre-crisis 
state (6 quarters before a crisis) derived from the results of the logistic regressions reported in 
table 3. Chart 4 depicts the Logistic SHERLOC for the whole sample for each type of crisis, 
and chart 5 the SHERLOCSs by region: 
37 The results shown in the table constitute the baseline for building the SHERLOC, although we have tested also the 
reliability of other specifications (see Appendix II for details). 
38 We have excluded the sovereign spread as it tends to be a simultaneous indicator of crisis instead of being a leading 
variable. Indeed, the ratio of good signals increases monotonously as we get closer to the crisis date, which is not the 
case for the rest of variables. In addition, the sovereign differential has the highest pairwise correlation on average with the 
rest of the regressors, and also the highest among them (-0.62 with the rating). Finally including the sovereign spread in 
the regression of currency and sovereign crises hardly vary the results.  
Even in this aggregate form39, the SHERLOC seems to capture the stress previous to 
the successive crises of the late 90s, the tranquil times between 2006 and 2009, and the recent 
increase in vulnerability in some EMEs, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
Sovereign stresses are close to historical lows except in Latin America, as well as banking 
stress, with the exception of Eastern Europe. 
39 The aggregate SHERLOC is the simple average of country’s SHERLOCs. Using a weighted average (via GDP in PPP 
terms or the number of crises of each country, to capture those more prone to register turbulences) does not alter the 
picture. 
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4.2.2 SHERLOC 2.0: FACTOR AUGMENTED LOGIT ESTIMATION 
Another alternative to estimate the predicted probability of being in a vulnerability state 
consists of relying on a factor-augmented logit approach. This methodology enables us to 
exploit all the available information in a dense model by using as explanatory variables the 
common factors extracted from the largest dataset that we have built. The underlying idea is 
to capture all the fundamental drivers of the economy that might lead to a vulnerable state. To 
do so, we first extract the common factors using a principal component analysis and incoporate 
all the factors with an eigenvalue higher than one in a logistic estimation40. The probability of 
being in a “vulnerable state” (i.e, six quarters prior to the crisis) is, therefore, assumed to follow 
a logistic distribution that depends on common factors, that is: 
൫ ௜ܻ௧ǡ ൌ ͳȁ ௜ܺǡ௧ǡ ߚ൯ ൌ 
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p
40 We end up wiht six common factors that account for 60% of the data variation among all the variables included in the 
principal component analysis.  
                                                                            
where ௜ܻ௧ is the period of vulnerability t ( six quarters) prior to a crisis in country i. ௜ܺǡ௧ stands for 
the six common factors extracted from the large dataset based on a principal component 
analysis41.  
In the factor-augmented logit estimation, we follow the methodology proposed by 
Chen et al (2011) due to two main reasons. First, our dummy variable is equal to one the six 
quarters previous to a crisis, and therefore we capture all the indicators that might affect crises 
from one lag to six lags prior to the onset of the crisis. In this sense, we do not consider 
41 The logistic regressions use a random effect model with standard errors derived from asymptotic theory (OIM) and 
include a constant term.  
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42 In their case, the dummy only takes value 1 when the economy is in recession and, hence, they need to include the 
dynamic effects in the explanatory variables 
necessary to include dynamics as Bellégo and Ferrara (2012) do42. Second, as pointed out by 
Chen et al (2011), the extracted factors from the PCA “may already incorporate the lags of 
underlying dynamic factors”. 
Charts 6 and 7 show the developments of vulnerabilities based on the FA-logistic 
approach. Results are qualitative very similar to the previous logistic SHERLOC: Latin America 
is the most vulnerable region nowadays due to an increase in sovereign stress and in currency 
stress, which has also increased recently in Eastern Europe. 
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4.2.3 SHERLOC 3.0: PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALISYS 
Another way to build the SHERLOC is to synthetize the information contained in the 
variables that issue the best signals into a single index using principal component analisys 
techniques, once the indicators are standardized. Unlike the Logistic SHERLOC, the PCA 
SHERLOC simply indicates whether the vulnerability in a country at a moment of time is greater 
or lower than its historical average, and it is comparable for a country over time but not between 
countries. Finally, the possible advantage of the SHERLOC PCA could be that it eliminates the 
redundant information generated by the correlations between the selected variables, which 
could bias some results of the logistic estimation.  In addition, it enables us to previously assign 
the expected sign of the relationship between the selected variables and the vulnerability. Again, 
charts 8 and 9 show the aggregate results for the PCA SHERLOC:  
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Vulnerability related to banking and sovereign crises has substantially increased in 
recent quarters. The case of Latin American countries is striking, as the region increased their 
vulnerability related to currency crisis to reach historical highs. Sovereign and banking 
vulnerability also rose to levels similar to those of the beginning of the 2000s.  
4.2.4 SHERLOC 4.0: MEAN PERCENTILES OF RISKS: 
Finally an easier way to compute the SHERLOC would be to calculate the mean of the 
percentiles of risks for the pre-selected variables. To do this we estimate the frequency 
distribution of the historical series of the preselected variables, excluding crisis times (to avoid 
possible biases) and then we calculate the average of the percentile position of each indicator. 
The advantage of this index lies in the fact that it standardizes all the relevant information using 
percentiles, bounded between 0 and 1. Therefore, it directly shows the level of risk at each 
moment of time in comparison with the level of risk over time. Its interpretation is 
straitghforward: a SHERLOC below 50% represents a level of risk below its historical median. 
Charts 10 and 11 present the Mean Percentile SHERLOC for the whole sample for each type 
of crisis and by region, respectively. Currency and sovereign stress vulnerability for all EMEs are 
slightly above the historical median, mainly on account of the recent development of 
vulnerability in Latin American countries and the rest of EMEs (Middle East and African 
countries). 
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ߠ  captures policy maker’s preferences between type I and type II errors. While Type I 
error calculates the share of missed vulnerable periods in terms of total number of stress, Type 
II errors represents the ratio of false alarms issued in terms of “tranquil periods”. A ߠ larger than 
0.5 reveals that a policy maker prefers receiving a false alarm than missing a crisis. 
 
4.3 Validating the SHERLOC 
 
In order to assess the performance of our synthetic indexes in predicting “pre-crisis” 
events, we follow the methodology proposed by Alessi and Detken (2011), which develop a 
measure of Absolute Usefulness based on policy maker’s preferences. This methodology has 
also been used by Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) to validate different models to predict systemic 
financial crisis and Babecký et al (2012) to assess the performance of early warning indicators 
of debt crises. An index is considered to be “useful” whenever there is a gain in using this index 
as compared to ignoring it. In other words, the loss of not using the index is larger than the loss 
of using the index.  
Assume that ܮሺߠሻ is the loss function when using the index proposed, which is 
dependent on policy makers’ preferences between type I and type II errors: 
ܮሺߠሻ ൌ ߠሺܶݕ݌݁ܫሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߠሻሺܶݕ݌݁ܫܫሻ 
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The measure of Absolute Usefulness (U) of Alessi and Detken (2011) is formally defined 
as: 
ܷ ൌ ሾߠǢ ͳ െ ߠሿ െ ܮሺߠሻ 
Where ሾߠǢ ͳ െ ߠሿ is the loss that the policy maker incurrs when ignoring the index 
(and therefore she either always assumes there is a signal and has to react if ߠ >0.5 or there is 
never a signal and does not react ifߠ ൏ ͲǤͷ); and  ܮሺߠሻ is the loss function when using the index 
proposed, previously defined. In our framework, we suppose that policy makers are as 
concerned about missing a crisis as they are about issuing a false alarm, and therefore we 
setߠ ൌ ͲǤͷ. 
Optimal thresholds are calculated by maximizing the measure of Absolute Usefulness 
(U). Additionally, we rank the indexes obtained using different methodological approaches 
according to its “Usefulness”. If this measure is positive, it provides useful signals for policy 
makers compared to ignoring it. The larger the measures, the higher the benefit.  
This methodology has several advantages. First, it takes into consideration policy 
makers’ preferences with regards missed crises versus false alarms. Second, it enables us to 
calculate the optimal threshold beyond which an early warning signal is issued. Thresholds are 
optimized for each index for the given preference parameter ߠ = 0.5 using all the information in 
the evaluation sample in order to get the percentile of the distribution that maximizes the 
Absolute Usefulness measure. Finally, it is quite intuitive and easily understood by policymakers. 
An index or model is “useful” whenever there is a benefit of using the index to detect vulnerable 
states or a pre-crisis periods.  
4.3.1 IN SAMPLE PERFORMANCES OF THE SHERLOCS: 
First, we evaluate the performance of the different indexes in predicting a “vulnerable” 
or a “pre-crisis” state using the sample over the period 1993 to 2018. For each index proposed, 
we calculate the threshold for the estimated likelihood of a “vulnerable” state that maximizes 
the usefulness score. 
Table 4 reports the evaluation in-sample for the banking, sovereign and currency 
indexes proposed and an aggregate index for all type of crises, based on the measure of 
Usefulness (U), the noise to signal ratio (NtSr), the percentage of predicted crisis (% Predicted) 
and the number of correct signals in terms of total signals issued (Cond Prob (%)). More 
specifically, this table presents the performance of the indexes for the four different 
methodological approaches used to build the indexes: the predicted probability based on a 
logistic estimation (logistic SHERLOC) and on a factor-augmented logistic approach (FA logistic 
approach), a principal component analysis from the variables preselected using the AUROC 
(PCA SHERLOC) and the simple average of the percentiles of the relevant variables according 
to the AUROC43 (mean percentile SHERLOC). Finally, for the sake of comparison, we also 
include the performance of the best single indicators derived from the AUROC: the short-term 
interbank rate in the case of the banking crises; and the sovereign spread for sovereign and 
currency indexes. The variation of reserves is also assessed for currency crises as it has been 
an early warning indicator broadly used in the literature, as well as the stock of banks and 
deposits in the case of the banking crises44.  
43 We preselect the variables with an AUROC above 65 in the case of banking and currency crises, and above 70 for 
sovereign crises.  
44 Results can be provided under request.  
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As expected, all models achieve a positive Usefulness measure, which suggests that 
the indexes proposed provide gains for policy makers. Indeed, the usefulness ratio found are 
similar to those reported by Alessi and Detken (2011) in a univariate setting and for the same 
preference parameter (θ) and by Babecký et al (2012) relying on a composite early warning 
index. Both papers find similar usefulness values of around 0.15-0.2545. Lo Duca and Peltonen 
(2013) obtain slightly larger Usefulness values than these two papers, with values around 0.19-
0.34, in line with the results of the Logistic SHERLOC presented in this paper for each type of 
crisis (0.20-0.33).  
More significantly, all the models proposed outperform their respective best single 
indicators: the short-term interbank rate for banking crises and the sovereign spread for 
sovereign and currency crises. Therefore, the use of a composite early warning index (the 
SHERLOC) seems to be more accurate to anticipate vulnerable states of countries than the use 
of a single indicator, which accords with the results of Babecký et al (2012) and Lo Duca and 
Peltonen (2013). However, in this paper we also show that the creation of an index for each 
type of crisis seems to outperform an aggregate index for all types of stress. Indeed, the 
usefulness values when using an aggregate index for all crises are much lower than the results 
of the SHERLOC, regardless of the methodology used and the type of crisis. The underlying 
reason is the wide heterogeneity of the nature of crises, which therefore should be treated in a 
different way.  
Table 4: In-sample performance of indexes 
Banking indexes           
Model 
Threshold (percentile) U NtSr % Predicted 
 Cond Prob 
(%) 
Logistic SHERLOC 75 0.33 0.24 86% 17% 
FA Logistic SHERLOC 72 0.30 0.29 84% 15% 
PCA SHERLOC 66 0.25 0.36 78% 12% 
Mean percentile SHERLOC 76 0.20 0.37 63% 11% 
Short-term interbank rate 56 0.19 0.50 79% 9% 
Sovereign indexes           
Logistic SHERLOC 72 0.27 0.32 79% 6% 
FA Logistic SHERLOC 75 0.24 0.32 71% 6% 
PCA SHERLOC 90 0.23 0.16 54% 12% 
Mean percentile SHERLOC 85 0.19 0.27 52% 7% 
Sovereign spread 55 0.17 0.57 77% 3% 
Currency indexes           
Logistic SHERLOC 57 0.20 0.50 81% 10% 
FA Logistic SHERLOC 74 0.26 0.31 74% 16% 
PCA SHERLOC 71 0.20 0.39 67% 13% 
Mean percentile SHERLOC 79 0.15 0.39 50% 13% 
Sovereign spread 55 0.08 0.74 59% 8% 
All crises           
Logistic SHERLOC 74 0.14 0.43 50% 18% 
FA Logistic SHERLOC 80 0.22 0.26 60% 27% 
PCA SHERLOC 64 0.16 0.47 60% 17% 
Mean percentile SHERLOC 55 0.10 0.67 63% 12% 
This table presents the in-sample validation exercise for the banking, sovereign, currency indexes proposed and an aggregate index  for all 
types of crises (all crises) and the four different methodological approaches used to build the indexes: the predicted probability  from a 
logistic estimation (Logistic SHERLOC) and from a factor augmented logistic estimation (FA Logistic Sherloc),  a principal  component analysis 
from the variables (PCA SHERLOC), and  the  average of the risk percentiles(mean percentile SHERLOC).  The validation exercise is based 
on the measure of Usefulness (U), the noise to signal ratio (NtSr), the percentage of predicted crises (% Predicted) and the number of correct 
signals in terms of total signals issued (Cond Prob (%). The threshold indicates the percentile beyond which the index issues a signal. Short-
term interbank rate and sovereign spread represent the best single indicators according to the AUROC. This exercise is based on a neutral 
policy maker (θ =0.5) and evaluation window six quarter previous to the crisis. 
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Additionally, the usefulness measures enables us to rank the different indexes 
proposed. The higher the usefulness measure, the better. The Logistic SHERLOC seems to 
outperform the three other methodologies used (the FA logistic SHERLOC; the PCA SHERLOC 
and the mean percentile SHERLOC) as it achieves higher usefulness scores for the banking 
and sovereign indexes46. In addition, the ratio of predicted crises are very high for the three 
types of crises considered (around 87% for banking crises, 79% for sovereign crises and 81% 
for currency crises).  
Finally, comparing the Logistic SHERLOC validation exercise with the outcome of 
previous literature, our index seems to outperform some of the indexes or variables proposed. 
Indeed, the usefulness measures of our analysis are similar or higher than the ones reported by 
Alessi and Detken (2011) and Babecky et al (2012). They found values around 0.20 and 0.25, 
and 0.20 respectively. In the case of our Logistic SHERLOC, we found values of 0.33, 0.27 and 
0.20 for banking, sovereign and currency, respectively. Therefore, our index seems to be better 
to predict banking and sovereign crises at least. However, results are not strictly comparable 
since their analysis focus on developed economies, instead of emerging economies, over a 
different period of analysis. In addition, Alessi and Detken (2011) predict asset booms instead 
46 The FA logistic SHERLOC achieves a higher usefulness for currency crises. 
                                                                            
of crises. If we compare it with Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013), they find similar values for a mixed 
sample of advanced and emerging economies. The percentage of predicted crises is also 
similar. But, they only focus on financial stress instead of taking a broader perspective and 
considering all types of stress. Finally, Lepers and Sánchez-Serrano do not provide any 
evaluation methodology, although they point out that their results are better than the usual 
credit to GDP gap. Nevertheless, the creation of asset bubbles as a vulnerability is captured in 
our analysis using two tail risks for real credit growth, but the AUROC results lead us to discard 
it. 
Therefore, the SHERLOC proposed will be based on the logistic estimation. However, 
as the PCA SHERLOC, whose interpretation is more straightforward and its update is simpler, 
also seems to perform adequately, it can be used as a robustness check. The FA logistic 
SHERLOC seems quite appropriate for currency crises. The Mean percentile SHERLOC will be 
discarded as its performance does not seem to be good enough.  
4.3.2 OUT OF SAMPLE PERFORMANCES OF THE SHERLOCS: 
Second, in order to assess the predictive ability of each index out-of-sample, we split 
our sample in two subsamples. The period from 1993 to 2007 is used to estimate our models 
and calibrate the optimal threshold beyond which each index issues an early warning signal. 
The last years of the sample (2008-2018) are used to estimate the performance out-of-
sample47.  
Table 5 presents the results of the out-of-sample validation for the different indexes 
proposed for the banking, sovereign and currency stress and an aggregate index for all type of 
crises. As expected, out-of-sample performance is slightly poorer than in-sample performance 
although usefulness measures remain positive and higher than the best single predictors, with 
the exception of sovereign crises and the FA logistic SHERLOC for currency and sovereign 
crises. Indeed, usefulness values hover around 0.06 and 0.15, which is somewhat in line with 
47 As we noted before, there seems to be some structural changes around 2006 as the number of crises dwindles 
(reaching zero in some quarters). Using 2007 as the break point enables us to have more crises out-of-sample to validate 
the SHERLOCs. Nevertheless we have also tested the performance of SHERLOCs from 2014 onwards, and the results 
(provided upon request) do not change significantly. Indeed, in some cases, the model improves in terms of performance, 
for instance for banking crises. 
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the out-of-sample results reported by Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013). As it was the case in in-
sample predictions, the SHERLOC indexes perform much better than the best single indicators 
and the use of an index for each type of crisis outperforms an aggregate index of all crises in 
terms of usefulness48.  
Finally, when comparing between the different methologies employed to construct the 
SHERLOC, the results are mixed. The Logistic SHERLOC performs adequately for currency 
and banking crises, as suggested by the usefulness measures and the percentage of predicted 
crises, 49% and 58%, respectively. However, the usefulness value for the sovereign crisis (0.08) 
is lower than the scores obtained with the PCA and mean percentile (0.12). Still, the percentage 
of predicted crises (50%) is higher or equal to the percentage predicted by the PCA and mean 
percentile. In addition, one needs to be aware that there were only three episodes of sovereign 
crises over this period, including the “hold-out” crisis in Argentina, which is a particular case, 
difficult to anticipate. In addition, the PCA SHERLOC also provides a positive usefulness 
measure out-of-sample, which suggests that it can also be an adequate measure to anticipate 
vulnerable states. The FA logistic SHERLOC only provides substantial gains in the case of 
48 Although the PCA SHERLOC for all crises also seems to perform adequately and the performance of the FA logistic 
approach for sovereign and currency crises is quite poor (0.04 and 0.01 respectively).  
                                                                            
currency crises, while its out-of-sample forecast performance is very low in the case of banking 
and sovereign crises. Therefore, this methodology can be used as a robustness check for 
currency crises. Finally, the Mean Percentile SHERLOC provides a low gain in the case of the 
currency index (0.06) and a poor performance in-sample, and, therefore, it is discarded. 
 
Table 5: Out-of-sample performance of indexes     
Banking indexes           
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr 
% 
Predicted 
 Cond Prob (%) 
Logistic SHERLOC 70 0.14 0.53 58% 4% 
FA Logistic SHERLOC 67 0.04 0.81 42% 3% 
PCA SHERLOC 51 0.13 0.65 75% 3% 
Mean percentile SHERLOC 70 0.14 0.54 58% 4% 
Short-term interbank rate 53 0.07 0.77 63% 3% 
Sovereign indexes           
Logistic SHERLOC 69 0.08 0.68 50% 2% 
FA Logistic SHERLOC 70 0.01 0.93 33% 2% 
PCA SHERLOC 80 0.12 0.45 44% 3% 
Mean percentile SHERLOC 74 0.12 0.52 50% 3% 
Sovereign spread 51 0.11 0.69 72% 2% 
Currency indexes           
Logistic SHERLOC 76 0.11 0.55 49% 8% 
FA Logistic SHERLOC 70 0.15 0.49 60% 9% 
PCA SHERLOC 61 0.08 0.70 54% 7% 
Mean percentile SHERLOC 79 0.06 0.66 33% 7% 
Sovereign spread 51 0.00 1.01 49% 5% 
All crises           
Logistic SHERLOC 66 0.07 0.71 49% 10% 
FA Logistic SHERLOC 71 0.07 0.65 43% 11% 
PCA SHERLOC 51 0.12 0.65 72% 11% 
Mean percentile SHERLOC 64 0.04 0.81 46% 9% 
This table presents the out-of-sample-sample validation exercise for the banking, sovereign, currency indexes proposed  and an aggregate 
index  for all types of crises (all crises) and the  four different methodological approaches used to build the indexes: the predicted probability  
from a logistic estimation (Logistic SHERLOC) and from a factor augmented logistic estimation (FA Logistic Sherloc),  a principal  
component analysis from the variables (PCA SHERLOC), and  the  average of the risk percentiles(mean percentile SHERLOC). The 
validation exercise is based on the measure of Usefulness (U), the noise to signal ratio (NtSr), the percentage of predicted crises (% 
Predicted) and the number of correct signals in terms of total signals issued (Cond Prob (%). The threshold indicates the percentile beyond 
which the index issues a signal. Short-term interbank rate and sovereign spread represent the best single indicators according to the 
AUROC. This exercise is based on a neutral policy maker (θ =0.5) and evaluation window of six quarters previous to the crisis. 
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4.3.3 SUMMING UP THE VALIDATION EXERCISE 
In light of the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises, the (preferred) vulnerability index 
proposed will be based on a logistic estimation as it outperforms other indexes in-sample and 
performs adequately out-of-sample. As a robustness check, the PCA SHERLOC can also be 
used since its out-of-sample performance remains good and the FA logistic SHERLOC can be 
monitored but only for currency crises. The Mean percentile SHERLOC will be discarded as its 
predictions do not seem to be good enough, especially in-sample. 
The high type II errors are a source of concern as suggested by the high noise to signal 
ratios and the low percentage of conditional probability both in-sample and out-of-sample. 
Indeed, early signals tend to be noisier, but they are more valuable for policymakers. A possible 
way to reduce the elevated noise is to take into consideration the “post-crisis bias”. Indeed, 
macroeconomic variables tend to show a strong persistence and therefore they have an 
“erratic” behavior in the recovery phase. This is one of the issues of binary choice models since 
the model cannot distinguish between a period where the economy is back to normal times 
and a period in which the country is still adjusting. As a robustness check, we remove post-
crisis years (4 quarters), as done with crisis years, at a cost of fewer observations. We show 
that considering the “post-crisis” bias is relevant to slightly reduce type II errors out-of-sample, 
but it does not seem to affect the ratio of crises predicted in-sample and it has only a marginal 
impact out-of-sample (See Appendix IV).  
Finally, our model is robust to different specifications and, broadly speaking, it tends 
to outperform these specifications. As robustness checks, we validate the performance of our 
SHERLOC using different logistic estimations: including and excluding some variables 
(Appendix II), using a different definition of currency crisis (Appendix III), taking into consideration 
the “pseudo-real time approach” (Appendix V), relying on different evaluation windows 
(Appendix VI), assuming different preferences of policy makers (Appendix VII), calculating the 
index by region (Appendix VIII), or using pooled data (Appendix IX). 
5 Conclusions and work ahead 
Is it possible to detect vulnerabilities in EMEs with enough time to implement measures 
to tame its effects from a financial stability point of view? In this paper we propose a user friendly 
tool to monitor vulnerabilities in 25 EMEs based on an index of vulnerabilities (labelled 
SHERLOC) for each type of crisis. These indexes capture the developments of the leading 
indicators to anticipate pre-crisis periods, selected using a signalling approach (Auroc) to 
mitigate the usual data mining issue. Statistical validation techniques suggest that the use of 
different SHERLOCs for each type of crisis implies a gain of utility with respect to the use of an 
aggregate index for all crises and with respect to the individual indicators with the best 
performance according to the Auroc. Results seem to be robust to different specifications of 
the SHERLOC and different subsamples, so we consider that this tool can be very useful to 
monitor risks in EMEs. 
Nevertheless one needs to be aware of the main pitfalls of the methodology used. 
First, noise remains elevated, partly due to the “post-crisis bias”. A possible solution is to 
remove post-crisis episodes at the cost of fewer observations. Second, the criticism of “this 
time is different” also applies. However, as “not every time is different” is also possible (even 
more probable in EMEs than in other countries), the use of variables that anticipate crises in the 
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past is useful. Third, binary choice models require a sufficient number of stress events to get 
robust results. To overcome this shortcoming, we can use continuous variables, such as 
Financial Stress Indicators (FSI) and apply Markov Switching models that endogenously 
determine the beginning and exit of the crisis, at the cost of not evaluating the “vulnerable” state 
but the “crisis period”. Additionally, the main drawback is to define continuous variables long 
enough to capture all the events and cover a large period of time. Fourth, the results depend 
on policymakers’ preferences for Type I and Type II errors, and also on the definition of crises. 
Finally, these models are not able to capture non-linearities. All of them would be interesting 
topics for future research. 
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APPENDIX I: MAIN FEATURES OF THE DATABASE 
1. Countries 
Countries included in the sample: 
Chart A1.1
Countries in the sample
Rest of EMEs
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2. Variables 
Table A1.1
VARIABLE SOURCE
FINANCIAL MARKETS
* Sovereign spread (bps level) JP Morgan EMBI or equivalent
* Sovereign spread (change over 3 months) JP Morgan EMBI or equivalent
* Stock Exchange index (change over 3 months) Thomsom Reuters
* Exchange rate vis a vis the USD (change over 3 months) Thomsom Reuters
MACROECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS
REAL SECTOR:
* GDP (change y-o-y) National Statistics, Oxford
* Inflation rate National Statistics
* Industrial production (12 month MA, y-o-y) National Statistics
* NEER overappreciation JP Morgan and own calculations
FISCAL SECTOR:
* Public sector balance (% GDP) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
* Public sector gross debt (% GDP) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
EXTERNAL SECTOR:
* Current account balance (% GDP) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
* Gross external debt (% GDP) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
* FDI (% GDP) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
* Short term external debt (% Reserves) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
* Reserves (% GDP) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
* External debt service (% exports) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
* Portfolio gross inflows (% GDP) National Statistics, Oxford, IMF IFS
BANKING SECTOR:
* Real credit to private sector (y-o-y) IMF IFS
* Real deposits on domestic banks (y-o-y) IMF IFS
* Loan to Deposit ratio IMF IFS
* Non performing loans (% total loans) National Central Banks, World Bank
* Net foreign assets of domestic banks (% GDP) IMF IFS
* Bank Stock Exchange (change over 3 months) Thomsom Reuters
* Spread of bank's external debt (3 months change) JP Morgan
* Short term interbank rate (%) National Central Banks
* Intermediation margin (loan rate - deposit rate) National Central Banks
WEALTH AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
* Per capita GDP (USD PPP and % change) World Bank
* GPR index Dario Caldara and Matteo Iacoviello
* Sovereign rating (average of the three main agencies) Standard and Poor's, Fitch, Moody's
CONTAGION RISKS
* VIX Thomsom Reuters
* 10 year US Treasury bond yield Thomsom Reuters
* Short term interest rate Thomsom Reuters
* Trade links Thomsom Reuters / own calculations
* EMBI sovereign spread Thomsom Reuters
* Oil prices Thomsom Reuters
Variables included in the AUROC exercise, mainly taken from the previous EWS literature
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Table A1.2
Observations
Variable Whole sample Whole sample No crisis Sovereign Currency Banking
Sov.spread 2083 450.9 337 2947 1981 993
3M change sov.spread 2042 2.6 1.9 12.6 22.3 6.2
3M change stock exchange 2316 5.4 3.6 40.4 82.4 5.1
3M change ER vs USD 2456 -1.6 -0.9 -10.4 -33.4 -3.1
GDP growth 2595 3.7 4.2 2.6 -4.4 1.5
Inflation rate 2591 67.1 10.7 1341.0 952.7 24.2
12M change Ind. production 2352 2.9 3.2 2.0 -5.2 0.5
NEER deviation from trend 2580 -5.4 -6.2 16.2 39.3 -14.5
Public sector balance 2560 -2.1 -2.0 -1.8 -5.2 -2.4
Public debt 2578 42.9 38.5 125.5 107.3 50.8
Real credit (y-o-y) 2577 7.1 9.0 1.6 -4.3 -7.8
Real deposits (y-o-y) 2578 7.0 8.0 6.1 -6.9 -0.9
Net Foreign Assets dom.banks 2594 -1.8 2.0 -6.1 -14.9 -8.6
Non performing loans (% total) 1716 6.5 5.6 7.3 7.2 15.2
Loan to Deposit ratio 2594 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
3M change stock banks 2290 5.7 4.6 28.5 48.8 4.6
Short term interbank rate 2533 11.0 9.4 20.7 47.5 17.5
Lending minus deposit rates 2514 7.5 6.9 10.0 21.0 10.9
Current account balance 2592 -0.5 -0.5 0.6 0.4 0.1
FDI 2589 2.6 2.5 2.0 1.6 3.5
External debt 2577 38.2 33.8 79.3 66.1 59.8
Short term ext.debt 2574 77.7 68.2 221.8 187.7 105.8
Reserves 2597 29.1 27.4 11.0 11.4 47.4
Ext.debt service 2562 29.5 26.5 48.8 45.7 44.8
Portfolio inflows 2529 0.9 1.0 -0.8 0.4 -0.1
GDP per capita 2600 13220.7 13716 7955 9467 11141
GDP per capita (change) 2600 4.8 5.2 3.7 -3.0 3.1
GPR index 1456 96.7 96.3 114.2 99.1 96.5
Sov.rating 2440 BBB- BBB- CCC B- BB
Int. Trade interconectedness 2574 25.7 25.9 32.2 28.2 23.0
VIX 2600 19.3 19.1 19.2 18.3 21.4
10Y Treasury yield 2600 4.2 4.1 5.2 4.9 5.0
3M US interbank rate 2600 2.9 2.7 3.6 3.4 3.9
Oil Price 2600 50.3 53.3 29.4 31.4 34.5
EMBI Global 2600 523.0 493.8 700.1 670.2 688.8
Mean
What does our data look like? Table A1.2 presents the mean for the variables included 
in the estimations of both parametric and non-parametric models, for the whole sample and for 
tranquil and stress times. Some of the results of the previous literature could be traced here. In 
a sovereign crisis, sovereign spreads soar and sovereign rates sunk in comparison with tranquil 
times. Moreover, a high external debt49 and short term external debt are also representative 
features of sovereign crises, which tend to be hand in hand with a sudden stop in capital inflows 
(portfolio) and are more frequent in poorer and more unstable countries (lower GDP per capita 
and higher political risk). Additionally, oil prices during sovereign crises tend to be lower, 
pointing to a lost of fiscal revenues in oil or commodity exporting countries that in the end could 
lead to a sovereign default. In the case of a currency crisis, nominal exchange rate deviation 
from the trend (currency overvaluation), activity data and public sector imbalances seem to be 
relevant. Moreover the authorities tend to sustain the exchange rate reducing their level of 
international reserves and increasing the short term interest rate. In some cases, the external 
position of the economy became unsustainable due to the net foreing asset position of 
domestic banks. Finally, banking crises are characterized by huge non-performing loans, a 
strong decrease in real credit and a negative net external position of domestic banks.  
49 Which tend to be correlated with high public debt in EMEs -especially at the beginning of the sample- as 
                                                                            
most of the external debt was public or publicly guaranteed. 
Chart A1.2 depicts the developments of some of the relevant variables six quarters 
before and six quarters after the onset of a crisis, labelled t, by type of crisis. This preliminary 
analysis suggests that in the case of sovereign crises the level and increase of external debt 
and the rise of public debt over GDP play a relevant role, while for currency crises the currency 
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3.- Crises 
This section provides a global overview of the trigger of the most relevevant crises in 
EMES; it briefly revises the literature on “generations” of currency crises; and it presents the 
dates of crises on which the Auroc and the estimations are based on.  
x Mexico (1995): The so-called Tequila crisis blew up in December 1994 in the midst of 
increasing political strains -the assassination of the PRI candidate for President-, a 
deteriorated banking sector, and a huge amount of dollar denominated short-term debt 
(Tesobonos). Its spillovers hit Argentina throughout 1995. 
x Asia (1997): The trigger of this crisis was a series of consecutive devaluations of dollar-
linked currencies of Asian countries, starting with the Thai bath in July 1997, on account 
of the strong devaluation of the Chinese Renminbi in 1994, which reduced the 
competitiveness of the economies that competed with China in similar value-added goods 
in third markets. The currency and maturity mismatches -due to the accumulation of dollar 
denominated short-term liabilities and domestic currency denominated long-term assets- 
in both firms and banks of the region fuelled the crisis. 
Chart A1.2
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overvaluation and the low level of reserves behave abnormally before a crisis. This points to the 
need of using the variables of the sample both in levels and, in some cases, in differences when 
estimating their accuracy as leading indicators of a crisis. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 37 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
x Argentina (2001) abandoned its currency board with the US dollar –established in 1991- 
and declared the default on its external debt at the end of 2001 in the aftermath of 
unsuccessful fiscal consolidation with the support of the IMF and in the midst of a deep 
political crisis.  
From a theoretical point of view, there are three “generations” of currency crisis 
models. The first generation (Krugman, 1979), explains speculative attacks on fixed exchange 
rates as a rational behaviour of markets that can anticipate the unsustainability of maintaining 
the parity and the increase of fiscal imbalances, reflected in a widening of the current account 
deficit as the economy is less and less competitive and cannot generate export revenues at the 
needed pace. When the attack occurs, authorities tend to sell international reserves and 
increase official rates until they finally devaluate the currency. For those models, variables like 
the public and current account balance, short term rates, the overvaluation of the currency, the 
inflation rate (which represents an effective overvaluation as the exchange rate used to be fixed 
and it is also related to the monetization of the fiscal deficit) and the level of reserves are 
essential. Second Generation Models (Obstfeld 1986) introduced an objective function of 
authorities that could decide to abandon the fixed rate whenever the loss is too high. This 
objective function depends on the deviations of GDP from its natural level and inflation. When 
markets’ expectations align on the prospect of a devaluation (due, for example, to a widening 
current account deficit) but the government does not devalue, inflation will be too low and GDP 
will be below the natural rate (unemployment will be too high). As authorities could face a high 
loss, they opt to devalue the currency (multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling prophecies). In this 
context, activity growth rates, inflation, the current account, and financial markets variables has 
to be taken into account. Finally third generation models (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999) 
highlight the interaction between banks and currency crises through balance sheets 
mismatches: banks could have borrowed short term foreign currency to finance long term 
projects, whose revenues are denominated in local currency. When an external event increases 
the cost of external funding, banks could go bankrupt, increasing the loss of currency crises. 
On the contrary, a domestic event (like a recession) that strains banks borrowers could lead to 
banks defaulting on its external loans and to a devaluation of the currency. Finally, if the 
government takes over banks, the risk of a fiscal crisis increases which feedbacks the currency 
crisis. This model adds to the previous set of variables net external positions of banks, loan to 
deposit ratio, and the change of credit and deposits. On sovereign crises, in the case of EMEs, 
fiscal imbalances tend also to be reflected in an increase of external debt, especially short term, 
and as usually domestic savings rates are low all variables related to external financing, such 
as FDI (more stable) and portfolio (less stable) foreign inflows are relevant. 
x Russia (1998) issued short-term dollar denominated debt (GKOs) which were put under 
default in August 1998 after a huge increase of their interest rates (up to 150%) and the 
strong decline in commodity prices that followed the Asian crisis. The Russian default led 
to the bankruptcy of the US fund LTCM and the intervention of the US Federal Reserve.  
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Table A1.3
Country Banking crises Sovereign crises Currency crises
1995q1-1996q2 1993q1-1993q2 2002q1-2002q2
2001q4-2004q3 2001q4-2005q2 2016q1
2014q3-2016q2 2018q3
1994q4-1997q3 1993q1-1994q1 1993q1-1994q3
2008q4
1998q1-1998q2 1994q1
Colombia 1998q2-2002q1
Czech Republic 1996q2-2003q2
1993q1-1995q2 1999q1
1999q3-2000q3 1999q4-2000q1
2008q4-2009q4
Egypt 2016q4
Hungary 1993q1-2015q2
India 1993q1-1993q2
Indonesia 1997q4-2000q4 1999q2-2002q3 1997q4-1998q1
Korea 1997q3-1998q4 1998q1
Date of crises, by type
Chile
Ecuador 1998q3-2001q3
Event
Argentina
Brazil
China
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Table A1.3 (contd.)
Country Banking crises Sovereign crises Currency crises
Mexico 1994q4-1997q1 1995q1
Nigeria 2009q3-2013q2 1999q1
2016q3
Peru 1993q1-1997q4
Poland 1993q1-1994q2
Romania 1993q1-1994q3 1993q4-1994q1
1997q1
Russia 1998q3-2001q3 1998q3-2000q3 1993q1-1995q1
2008q3-2010q1 1998q3
2015q1-2016q4 2014q4
South Africa 1993q1-1993q3
Thailand 1997q3-2002q2
Turkey 2000q4-2003q4 1994q1-1994q2
2001q2
Uruguay 2002q1-2006q2 2003q1-2003q2 2002q3
Venezuela 1994q1-1997q1 2017q4-2018q4 1996q1-1996q2
2002q3
2011q1
2014q2
2016q1-2016q3
2017q2-2017q3
2018q1-2018q3
Date of crises, by type
Event
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As a robustness check, we validate the performance of several indexes based on 
different specifications. Indeed, one of the striking results is that some variables that are 
commonly found to be leading indicators by the literature have been excluded in our index since 
its performance was very poor in terms of its AUROC. This is the case of non-performing loans 
for banking crises, or the deviations (overvaluation) of effective exchange rates for currency 
stress. That is why, we decide to carry out a robustness check exercise including some of these 
variables. Moreover, we also wonder if our index would have performed better if we exclude 
external factors, such as short and long term interest rates in the US for banking crises and 
trade links in the case of sovereign stress. Finally, we also check if the inclusion of sovereign 
spread (in level or in changes) improves the sovereign index in terms of usefulness.  
APPENDIX II: AUROC RESULTS AND DIFFERENT SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE SHERLOCS 
 
Table A2.1 presents the AUROC results for all the variables included in the sample.  
Table A2.1
Variable All crises Banking Sovereign Currency Latin America East. Eur. Asia Other EMEs Before 2007Q1 After 2007q1
Sov.spread 0.73 0.59 0.90 0.80 0.77 0.64 0.18 0.83 0.68 0.77
3M change sov.spread 0.58 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.57 0.64 0.43 0.63 0.61 0.56
3M change stock exchange 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.45 0.55 0.60 0.67 0.59 0.42
3M change ER vs USD 0.60 0.59 0.64 0.63 0.59 0.57 0.62 0.59 0.64 0.55
GDP growth 0.60 0.53 0.83 0.67 0.67 0.58 0.35 0.57 0.60 0.63
Inflation rate 0.74 0.64 0.68 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.68 0.79 0.64 0.86
12M change Ind. production 0.59 0.58 0.68 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.52 0.65 0.61 0.59
NEER deviation from mean trend 0.59 0.68 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.49 0.72 0.62 0.63 0.55
NEER deviation from HP trend 0.46 0.44 0.39 0.48 0.39 0.43 0.64 0.55 0.43 0.49
Public sector balance 0.56 0.39 0.57 0.66 0.70 0.56 0.26 0.57 0.53 0.64
Public sector balance (first diff) 0.57 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.56 0.65 0.67 0.63 0.50
Public debt 0.45 0.38 0.70 0.53 0.56 0.39 0.12 0.52 0.36 0.57
Public debt (first diff) 0.62 0.57 0.74 0.69 0.62 0.59 0.41 0.77 0.64 0.63
Real credit (y-o-y) 0.57 0.59 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.74 0.79 0.55 0.54 0.61
Real credit (y-o-y) tail2 0.43 0.41 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.26 0.21 0.45 0.46 0.39
Real deposits (y-o-y) 0.53 0.58 0.45 0.49 0.42 0.65 0.69 0.58 0.51 0.55
Net Foreign Assets dom.banks 0.59 0.68 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.65 0.57 0.66 0.51
Non performing loans (% total) 0.48 0.62 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.32 0.48 0.54 0.44
Loan to Deposit ratio 0.54 0.71 0.62 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.93 0.40 0.71 0.31
3M change stock banks 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.47 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.57 0.43
Short term interbank rate 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.75 0.69 0.73 0.91 0.73 0.75 0.69
Lending minus deposit rates 0.55 0.51 0.59 0.60 0.50 0.52 0.31 0.75 0.48 0.42
Current account balance 0.57 0.60 0.52 0.58 0.58 0.40 0.79 0.54 0.68 0.45
Curr.acc.balance (first diff) 0.61 0.55 0.46 0.61 0.60 0.64 0.47 0.74 0.62 0.61
FDI 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.61 0.72 0.54 0.42 0.54 0.47 0.63
FDI (first diff) 0.47 0.45 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.39 0.54 0.48 0.47
External debt 0.47 0.52 0.73 0.47 0.50 0.30 0.58 0.18 0.50 0.43
External debt (first diff) 0.58 0.60 0.66 0.60 0.56 0.62 0.59 0.54 0.61 0.57
Short term ext.debt 0.67 0.66 0.87 0.71 0.72 0.56 0.82 0.25 0.70 0.62
Reserves over GDP 0.64 0.54 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.61 0.76 0.64 0.56 0.70
Reserves / GDP (first diff) 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.46 0.57 0.52 0.53
Reserves (m.USD) 0.61 0.56 0.76 0.62 0.56 0.65 0.82 0.45 0.54 0.64
Ext.debt service 0.57 0.58 0.74 0.58 0.65 0.42 0.52 0.30 0.60 0.52
Portfolio inflows 0.52 0.62 0.33 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.34 0.61 0.43
Portfolio inflows (first diff) 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.44 0.51 0.47
Portfolio inflows tail2-decline 0.48 0.38 0.67 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.62 0.39 0.57
Portfolio inflows (first diff) tail 2 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.48 0.53
GDP per capita 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.55 0.52 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.52 0.53
GDP per capita (change) 0.60 0.50 0.84 0.68 0.68 0.55 0.41 0.58 0.59 0.63
Sov.rating 0.65 0.51 0.88 0.73 0.74 0.55 0.34 0.92 0.52 0.79
Political risk 0.45 0.41 0.50 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.36 , 0.40 0.54
Political risk (change) 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.54 0.51
VIX 0.52 0.53 0.63 0.50 0.51 0.46 0.53 0.65 0.52 0.49
US 10Y treasury bond rate 0.65 0.78 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.76 0.92 0.30 0.73 0.56
US 3M interbank rate 0.62 0.75 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.73 0.85 0.41 0.64 0.53
Oil Price 0.38 0.30 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.16 0.47 0.29 0.53
Int. Trade interconectedness 0.53 0.45 0.72 0.57 0.53 0.60 0.17 0.74 0.49 0.62
AUROC results: percentage of good signals issued 6 quarters before the onset of each type of crisis. Red bolded cells indicate an AUROC above 70% and orange
bolded cells an AUROC above 65%. 
By type of crisis By region By time
Table A2.2, A2.3 and A2.4 present the results for the banking, sovereign and currency 
stress, respectively. Broadly speaking, the indexes based on the AUROC results seem to 
outperform the other specifications both in-sample and out-of-sample. This is true for the 
banking and sovereign indexes. However, in the case of currency crises, the inclusion of the 
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Table A2.2: Robustness check. Banking indexes       
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr 
% 
Predicted 
 Cond Prob 
(%) 
In-sample performance         
Banking 75 0.33 0.24 86% 17% 
Banking RC1 67 0.28 0.35 86% 13% 
Banking RC2 81 0.24 0.25 63% 12% 
Banking RC3 83 0.25 0.21 63% 14% 
Out-of-sample performance         
Banking 70 0.14 0.53 58% 4% 
Banking RC1 74 0.03 0.83 33% 3% 
Banking RC2 71 -0.11 3.62 8% 1% 
Banking RC3 67 -0.07 1.65 21% 1% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for different specifications for the banking index. Banking is the model 
proposed, based on the AUROC results. RC1 includes the same variables except for external factors. RC2 also excludes external factors, 
but includes NPL. Finally, RC3 includes NPL and external factors. The validation exercise is based on the measure  of Usefulness (U), 
the noise to signal ratio (NtSr), the percentage of predicted crises (% Predicted) and the number of correct signals in terms of total 
signals issued (Cond Prob (%). The threshold indicates the percentile beyond which the index issues a signal. This exercise is based on 
a neutral policy maker (θ =0.5) and an evaluation window of six quarters previous to the crisis. 
 
Table A2.3: Robustness check. Sovereign indexes       
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr % Predicted  Cond Prob (%) 
In-sample performance           
Sovereign 72 0.27 0.32 79% 6% 
Sovereign RC1 82 0.27 0.22 69% 9% 
Sovereign RC2 78 0.22 0.31 64% 6% 
Sovereign RC3 80 0.28 0.24 74% 8% 
Out of sample performance            
Sovereign 69 0.08 0.68 50% 2% 
Sovereign RC1 78 0.04 0.78 33% 2% 
Sovereign RC2 70 0.08 0.68 50% 2% 
Sovereign RC3 69 0.13 0.56 61% 3% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for different specifications for the sovereign index. Sovereign is the model 
proposed, based on the AUROC results. RC1 includes the same variables except for external factors. RC 2 also excludes external 
factors, but includes sovereign spread. Finally, RC3 includes the sovereign spread and external factors. The validation exercise is based 
on the measure  of Usefulness (U), the noise to signal ratio (NtSr), the percentage of predicted crises (% Predicted) and the number of 
correct signals in terms of total signals issued (Cond Prob (%). The threshold indicates the percentile beyond which the index issues a 
signal. This exercise is based on a neutral policy maker (θ =0.5) and an evaluation window of six quarters previous to the crisis.  
effective exchange rate and exclusion of rating seem to improve in terms of usefulness. We 
decide to maintain the results of the AUROC in order to avoid data mining and cherry-picking 
issues, though we are aware that policymakers also need to monitor the development of the 
effective exchange rate.  
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Table A3.1: Robustness check. Currency crisis      
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr % Predicted 
 Cond Prob 
(%) 
In-sample performance           
Currency 72 0.21 0.38 68% 13% 
Out of sample performance      
Currency 76 0.00 1.03 25% 5% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for the currency index, based on the predicted probility from a logistic 
estimation, using a different definition of event. Currency crisis is defined as a depreciation of at least 15% on a quarterly basis as long 
as this depreciation exceeds the average variation of the exchange rate plus a standard deviation. 
Table A2.4: Robustness check. Currency indexes     
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr % Predicted  Cond Prob (%) 
In-sample performance            
Currency 57 0.20 0.50 81% 10% 
Currency RC1 71 0.21 0.38 69% 13% 
Currency RC2 63 0.24 0.41 83% 12% 
Currency RC3 65 0.22 0.42 77% 13% 
Out of sample performance           
Currency 76 0.11 0.55 49% 8% 
Currency RC1 59 0.11 0.66 65% 7% 
Currency RC2 76 0.14 0.48 54% 10% 
Currency RC3 78 0.11 0.50 44% 10% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for different specifications for the currency index. Currency is the model proposed, 
based on the AUROC results. RC1 includes the same variables except for rating. RC 2 also excludes rating, but includes nominal effective 
exchange rate. RC3 includes the same variables than in “Currency” and sovereign spread. The validation exercise is based on the measure  of 
Usefulness  (U),  the noise to signal ratio (NtSr),  the percentage of predicted crises (% Predicted) and the number of correct signals in terms of 
total signals issued (Cond Prob (%). Threshold indicates the percentile beyond which the index issues a signal. This exercise is based on a 
neutral policy maker (θ =0.5) and an evaluation window of six quarters previous to the crisis. 
 
APPENDIX III:  DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF CURRENCY CRISIS 
As currency crises are defined using a quantitative threshold instead of using events, 
such as done for the banking and sovereign crises, we carry out a robustness exercise using a 
broader definition of currency crisis. Currency crisis is defined, in this case, as a depreciation 
of at least 15% on a quarterly basis as long as this depreciation exceeds the average variation 
of the exchange rate plus a standard deviation.  
The AUROC and logistic results are very similar to the outcome of the baseline 
specification. Almost the same variables are preselected using the AUROC, though rating and 
reserves are not included. The variables included in the logistic regression have the expected 
sign and they are significant. Table A3.1 reports the in-sample and out-of-sample validation 
results for the currency index using a broader definition. While in-sample results remain similar 
to those reported in the baseline specification in terms of usefulness, out-of-sample results are 
very poor. There is no gain in using this model out-of-sample, and therefore we conclude that 
it is more appropiate to stick to a narrow definition of currency crisis.  
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A relevant issue in EWS is to carry out real-time exercises of the models proposed, 
which implies the development and estimation of its performance using the real data that policy 
makers would have at the moment of making decisions. In the tool proposed, the composite 
indexes are updated with the available information up to this moment, and therefore are real-
time exercises. However, the validation exercise has been done without considering the “real-
time” approach for two main reasons. First, we do not have the vintages and therefore, we can 
only assess its performance using a “pseudo-real time” approach. Second, due to the wide 
heterogeneity of countries and indicators used in our model, publications lags are difficult to 
The use of a binary indicator to define periods of stress suffers from a “post-crisis” 
bias, that is, it is not able to distinguish between normal periods and the recovery phase after 
a crisis. As a robustness check, we remove post-crisis years (4 quarters), as done with crisis 
years, at a cost of fewer observations. The AUROC and the logistic approach are re-estimated 
using this new definition of stress periods. The results of our baseline model are robust to this 
new specification since estimates hardly vary.  
Table A4.1 presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercise when dealing with the 
post-crisis bias. In our case, we show that considering the “post-crisis” bias, by eliminating the 
data of four quarters after a crisis, is relevant to slightly reduce type II errors (false alarms) out-
of-sample, but it does not seem to affect the ratio of crises predicted in-sample and it has only 
a marginal impact out-of-sample.  
APPENDIX IV: DEALING WITH THE POST-CRISIS BIAS  
 
Table A4.1: Robustness check. Dealing with the post-crisis bias   
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr 
% 
Predicted 
 Cond Prob (%) 
In-sample performance            
Banking 76 0.33 0.23 85% 18% 
Sovereign 74 0.26 0.31 75% 7% 
Currency 69 0.20 0.41 69% 12% 
Out of sample performance      
Banking 70 0.14 0.53 58% 4% 
Sovereign 70 0.11 0.61 56% 3% 
Currency 68 0.14 0.55 63% 9% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for three different indexes minimising the post-crisis bias, based on the 
predicted probability from a logistic estimation. To assess the post-crisis bias, we remove the four quarters after the crisis in both the 
AUROC and the logistic estimations. 
 
APPENDIX V:  PSEUDO REAL TIME SHERLOCS  
assess and the use of a common lags to all the countries could bias the results. That is why, 
we decide to keep the exercise as simple as possible. However, in order to confirm that our 
results remain robust, we carry out a “pseudo-real exercise” for validating the performance of 
the model proposed, the Logistic SHERLOC.  
Table A5.1 presents the results for in-sample and out-of-sample exercises50, using a 
“pseudo-real time” approach. To do so, we include common lags to the variables preselected 
50 For the out-of-sample exercise, we divide our sample into two subsamples. 1993-2006 and 2007-2018. The first 
subsample is used to calibrate the model and the second subsample to validate its performance.  
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using the AUROC: one lag (one quarter) for all the macroeconomic variables except for the 
loan-to-deposit ratio, in which we include two lags. Financial variables are included 
contemporaneously. 
In-sample and out-of-sample results are very similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 
5 of the main text. Usefulness measures are positive for the three indexes, and close to the 
values obtained when discarding the real-time approach. Indeed, while in the in-sample 
exercise, the usefulness gains are slightly lower, they are considerably higher for the out-of-
sample validation for the sovereign indexes, confirming our results.  
 
 
APPENDIX VI:  EVALUATION WINDOW: FOUR AND EIGHT QUARTERS 
The SHERLOC has been constructed using an evaluation window of six quarters prior 
to the crisis in the AUROC and calculating the probability of being in a “vulnerable state”, defined 
as six quarters before the onset of the crisis. The election of this period is based on the seminal 
work of Kaminsky et al (2000), which show that early indicators tend to appear 10 to 18 months 
before the beginning of the crisis. Additionally, policymakers need to be warned in advance to 
allow for an earlier implementation of policy tools.  
However, as a robustness check, we estimate the AUROC, the Logistic SHERLOC 
and the validation exercise using an evaluation window of four and eight quarters. The results 
of the latter are reported in Table A6.1 and A6.2, respectively. Results are robust to this new 
Table A5.1: Robustness check. "Pseudo-real time" indexes 
Model Threshold (percentile) U NtSr % Predicted  Cond Prob (%) 
In-sample performance          
Banking 73 0.32 0.26 85% 16% 
Sovereign 84 0.25 0.21 65% 9% 
Currency 79 0.19 0.33 57% 15% 
Out of sample performance       
Banking 63 0.11 0.63 58% 3% 
Sovereign 64 0.14 0.59 67% 3% 
Currency 66 0.10 0.63 54% 7% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample validation exercise for the banking, sovereign, currency indexes proposed for the 
predicted probability using a logistic estimation (Logistic SHERLOC). In order to calculate the pseudo-real time idex, common lags have 
been included for most variables.The validation exercise is based on the measure of Usefulness (U), the noise to signal ratio  (NtSr), the 
percentage of predicted crises (% Predicted) and the number of correct signals in terms of total signals issued (Cond Prob) (%). The threshold 
indicates the percentile beyond which the index issues a signal. This exercise is based on a neutral policy maker (θ =0.5) and an evaluation 
window of six quarters previous to the crisis. 
specification. In-sample validation resuts are quite similar in both cases (four and eight quarters). 
Out-of-sample results improve in the case of four quarters for sovereign and banking crises in 
terms of the usefulness measure, but the gain is lower in the case of currency stresses. The 
opposite results are obtained when using an evaluation window of two years. In any case, the 
range of usefulness measures remain adequate for an out-of-sample exercise.  
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In our baseline model, we assume that policy makers are as concerned about missing 
a crisis as they are about issuing a false alarm. As a result, the validation exercise in sub-section 
5.3 is carried out by imposing that θ=0.5. However, it is relevant from a policy maker point of 
view to know how sensitive these results are to the choice of θ. That is why, in this appendix, 
we validate the logistic SHERLOC assuming different preferences of policy makers.  
Table A7.1 presents the results for the banking, sovereign and currency indexes 
proposed for the Logistic SHERLOC assuming different values for the parameter θ.  Regardless 
of their preferences, policy makers would benefit from using the indexes. This is particularly true 
for the case of assuming preferences close to a neutral policy maker (i.e, θ=0.4 or θ=0.6). All 
 
 
Table A6.1: Robustness check. Evaluation window 4 quarters prior to the crisis.   
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr 
% 
Predicted 
 Cond Prob 
(%) 
In-sample performance           
Banking 74 0.32 0.25 86% 16% 
Sovereign 74 0.26 0.31 75% 6% 
Currency 73 0.17 0.42 59% 11% 
Out-of-sample performance         
Banking 74 0.14 0.48 56% 3% 
Sovereign 62 0.12 0.65 67% 2% 
Currency 72 0.06 0.72 44% 7% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for the banking, sovereign and currency indexes using an evaluation 
window of four quarters instead of six. The "vulnerable state" in the logistic estimation is defined as the four quarters previous to the 
onset of the stress period. 
Table A6.2: Robustness check. Evaluation window 8 quarters prior to the crisis.   
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr % Predicted 
 Cond 
Prob (%) 
In-sample performance           
Banking 77 0.32 0.23 83% 18% 
Sovereign 84 0.29 0.19 71% 10% 
Currency 57 0.20 0.50 81% 10% 
Out-of-sample performance         
Banking 62 0.05 0.79 50% 3% 
Sovereign 79 0.06 0.66 33% 2% 
Currency 78 0.12 0.48 46% 10% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for the banking, sovereign and currency indexes using an evaluation 
window of eight quarters instead of six. The "vulnerable state" in the logistic estimation is defined as the eight quarters previous to the 
onset of the stress period. 
APPENDIX VII: POLICY MAKERS’ PREFERENCES 
models have a positive usefulness except for the case of currency crises assuming a strong 
preference with regards to not missing crises (θ=0.8).  
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In the baseline specification, we decide to build the SHERLOCs distinguishing by type 
of stress event, instead of focusing on a dummy for all crises or constructing the SHERLOC by 
region due to the different nature of crises. However, as a robustness check, we also build the 
SHERLOC using a regional approach. This means that the AUROC and the logistic SHERLOC 
are estimated using only the information of each region.  
The validation exercise confirms our approach (See Table A8.1). In-sample 
performance is extremely good, with usefulness measures around 0.45 in the case of Asia, but 
out-of-sample results are very disappointing with a negative value in the case of Africa and not 
Table A7.1: Robustness check. Performance of the model depending on the choice of 
θ   
Model 
Threshold (percentile) θ U NtSr % Predicted  Cond 
Prob (%) 
Banking 75 0.5 0.33 0.24 86% 17% 
Banking 73 0.6 0.23 0.26 88% 16% 
Banking 80 0.4 0.23 0.20 81% 20% 
Banking 66 0.7 0.15 0.33 91% 13% 
Banking 80 0.3 0.13 0.20 81% 20% 
Banking 66 0.8 0.07 0.33 91% 13% 
Banking 81 0.2 0.03 0.20 79% 20% 
Sovereign 72 0.5 0.27 0.32 79% 6% 
Sovereign 84 0.4 0.18 0.20 67% 10% 
Sovereign 72 0.6 0.17 0.32 79% 6% 
Sovereign 86 0.3 0.10 0.19 63% 10% 
Sovereign 63 0.7 0.08 0.42 83% 5% 
Sovereign 91 0.2 0.03 0.16 48% 12% 
Sovereign 63 0.8 0.00 0.42 83% 5% 
Currency 57 0.5 0.20 0.50 81% 10% 
Currency 57 0.6 0.12 0.50 81% 10% 
Currency 86 0.4 0.12 0.25 48% 19% 
Currency 86 0.3 0.06 0.25 48% 19% 
Currency 52 0.7 0.05 0.55 83% 9% 
Currency 93 0.2 0.01 0.19 29% 23% 
Currency 50 0.8 -0.02 0.57 84% 9% 
This table presents the in-sample exercise for the banking, sovereign and currency logistic SHERLOC indexes using different values for the 
parameter θ using an evaluation of six quarters. 
APPENDIX VIII: INDEXES BY REGION 
predicting any crise in the case of Asia. This suggests that the regional approach suffers from 
the criticism of “this time is different”. That means that it is able predict past crises, as regional 
results are biased with their own past stress episodes, but not future crises. By contrast, an 
approach distinguishing by type of stress seems to partially mitigate this issue since we are 
considering different kind of stress that can take place in other countries.  
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Table A9.1: Robustness check. Indexes using pooled data.     
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr 
% 
Predicted 
 Cond 
Prob (%) 
In-sample performance           
Banking 76 0.30 0.25 80% 17% 
Sovereign 74 0.25 0.32 73% 6% 
Currency 58 0.15 0.57 71% 9% 
Out-of-sample performance         
Table A8.1: Robustness check. Indexes by region.        
Model 
Threshold 
(percentile) 
U NtSr 
% 
Predicted 
 Cond Prob 
(%) 
In-sample performance         
Latin America 66 0.21 0.38 68% 27% 
Eastern Europe 61 0.32 0.31 91% 27% 
Asia 88 0.46 0.09 100% 39% 
Africa 86 0.25 0.20 61% 25% 
Out-of-sample performance         
Latin America 73 0.08 0.61 42% 17% 
Eastern Europe 59 0.03 0.86 50% 8% 
Asia 77 -   -  - 0% 
Africa 99 -0.19 3.25 17% 4% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for indexes based only on the regional information. The AUROC 
and the logit have been estimated considering only the information of each region. In the case of Africa, the out-of-sample 
validation has been carried out splitting the sample before and after 2014 due to the lack of enough crisis events before 2007. 
 
APPENDIX IX:  INDEXES USING POOLED DATA 
Finally, in the baseline model, individual country effects are incorporated into the model 
by using random effects, as suggested by the Hausman test. However, some papers opt to 
pool observations across countries whenever the group is homogeneous and there are not 
enough crises to separate countries. In our case, the sample of countries is quite 
heterogeneous, as already discussed, and therefore we opt to include individual country effects.  
As a robustness check, we calculate indexes using pooled data. In the logistic 
estimation, we get the expected sign and significance in the results. In-sample and out-of-
sample validation results are quite similar to the results of the baseline model, though slightly 
worse in terms of usefulness values. However, we still believe that in our case the random effect 
approach is the correct way of dealing with this exercise due to the high heterogeneity of 
countries analysed.  
 
Banking 73 0.18 0.44 63% 5% 
Sovereign 69 0.09 0.62 50% 2% 
Currency 59 0.04 0.83 49% 6% 
This table presents the in-sample and out-of-sample exercises for different specifications for the banking, sovereign and 
currency indexes using pooled data in the logistic estimation instead of random effects. 
In this section, we present the Logistic SHERLOCS for some countries of our sample. 
Thresholds are calculated using the percentiles given by the validation model (75% for banking 
crises, 72% for sovereign crises and 57% for currency crises). The SHERLOCs of the rest of 
countries can be provided under request.  
 
APPENDIX X: SHERLOCS FOR MOST RELEVANT EMES 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 48 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
   Appendix IX (1)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Argentina: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Argentina: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Argentina: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
  Appendix IX (2)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Brazil: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Brazil: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Brazil: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 50 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
  Appendix IX (3)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
China: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
China: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
China: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 51 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
  Appendix IX (4)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Indonesia: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Indonesia: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Indonesia: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 52 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
 
Appendix IX (5)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Korea: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Korea: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Korea: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 53 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
  Appendix IX (6)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Mexico: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Mexico: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Mexico: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 54 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
 
Appendix IX (7)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Russia: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Russia: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Russia: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
  Appendix IX (8)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
South Africa: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
South Africa: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
South Africa: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 56 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
 
Appendix IX (9)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Turkey: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Turkey: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Turkey: SHERLOCs
Start of a currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 57 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1946
 Appendix IX (10)
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Venezuela: SHERLOCs
Start of a banking crisis
Banking
Threshold
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Venezuela: SHERLOCs
Start of a sovereign
crisis
Sovereign
Threshold
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
19931 19951 19971 19991 20011 20031 20051 20071 20091 20111 20131 20151 20171
Venezuela: SHERLOCs
Start of a
currency crisis
Currency
Threshold
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1840  ALESSIO MORO and OMAR RACHEDI: The changing structure of government consumption spending.
1841  GERGELY GANICS, ATSUSHI INOUE and BARBARA ROSSI: Confi dence intervals for bias and size distortion in IV
and local projections – IV models.
1842  MARÍA GIL, JAVIER J. PÉREZ, A. JESÚS SÁNCHEZ and ALBERTO URTASUN: Nowcasting private consumption: 
traditional indicators, uncertainty measures, credit cards and some internet data.
1843  MATÍAS LAMAS and JAVIER MENCÍA: What drives sovereign debt portfolios of banks in a crisis context?
1844  MIGUEL ALMUNIA, POL ANTRÀS, DAVID LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ and EDUARDO MORALES: Venting out: exports during 
a domestic slump.
1845  LUCA FORNARO and FEDERICA ROMEI: The paradox of global thrift.
1846  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI and MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE: An economic analysis of court fees: evidence from 
the Spanish civil jurisdiction.
1847  MIKEL BEDAYO, ÁNGEL ESTRADA and JESÚS SAURINA: Bank capital, lending booms, and busts. Evidence from 
Spain in the last 150 years.
1848  DANIEL DEJUÁN and CORINNA GHIRELLI: Policy uncertainty and investment in Spain.
1849  CRISTINA BARCELÓ and ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The risk of job loss, household formation and housing demand: 
evidence from differences in severance payments.
1850  FEDERICO TAGLIATI: Welfare effects of an in-kind transfer program: evidence from Mexico.
1851  ÓSCAR ARCE, GALO NUÑO, DOMINIK THALER and CARLOS THOMAS: A large central bank balance sheet? Floor vs 
corridor systems in a New Keynesian environment.
1901  EDUARDO GUTIÉRREZ and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Trade and credit: revisiting the evidence.
1902 LAURENT CAVENAILE and PAU ROLDAN: Advertising, innovation and economic growth.
1903  DESISLAVA C. ANDREEVA and MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA: The impact of the ECB’s targeted long-term refi nancing 
operations on banks’ lending policies: the role of competition.
1904  ANDREA ALBANESE, CORINNA GHIRELLI and MATTEO PICCHIO: Timed to say goodbye: does unemployment 
benefi t eligibility affect worker layoffs?
1905  CORINNA GHIRELLI, MARÍA GIL, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ALBERTO URTASUN: Measuring economic and economic 
policy uncertainty, and their macroeconomic effects: the case of Spain.
1906  CORINNA GHIRELLI, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ALBERTO URTASUN: A new economic policy uncertainty index for Spain.
1907  ESTEBAN GARCÍA-MIRALLES, NEZIH GUNER and ROBERTO RAMOS: The Spanish personal income tax: 
facts and parametric estimates.
1908  SERGIO MAYORDOMO and OMAR RACHEDI: The China syndrome affects banks: the credit supply channel of 
foreign import competition.
1909  MÓNICA CORREA-LÓPEZ, MATÍAS PACCE and KATHI SCHLEPPER: Exploring trend infl ation dynamics in Euro Area 
countries.
1910  JAMES COSTAIN, ANTON NAKOV and BORJA PETIT: Monetary policy implications of state-dependent prices and wages.
1911  JAMES CLOYNE, CLODOMIRO FERREIRA, MAREN FROEMEL and PAOLO SURICO: Monetary policy, corporate 
fi nance and investment.
1912 CHRISTIAN CASTRO and JORGE E. GALÁN: Drivers of productivity in the Spanish banking sector: recent evidence.
1913 SUSANA PÁRRAGA RODRÍGUEZ: The effects of pension-related policies on household spending.
1914  MÁXIMO CAMACHO, MARÍA DOLORES GADEA and ANA GÓMEZ LOSCOS: A new approach to dating the reference  
cycle.
1915  LAURA HOSPIDO, LUC LAEVEN and ANA LAMO: The gender promotion gap: evidence from Central Banking.
1916  PABLO AGUILAR, STEPHAN FAHR, EDDIE GERBA and SAMUEL HURTADO: Quest for robust optimal 
macroprudential policy.
1917  CARMEN BROTO and MATÍAS LAMAS: Is market liquidity less resilient after the fi nancial crisis? Evidence for US 
treasuries.
1918  LAURA HOSPIDO and CARLOS SANZ: Gender Gaps in the Evaluation of Research: Evidence from Submissions to 
Economics Conferences.
1919  SAKI BIGIO, GALO NUÑO and JUAN PASSADORE: A framework for debt-maturity management.
1920  LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ, MARÍA DOLORES GADEA and ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS: Infl ation interdependence in advanced 
economies.
1921  DIEGO BODAS, JUAN R. GARCÍA LÓPEZ, JUAN MURILLO ARIAS, MATÍAS J. PACCE, TOMASA RODRIGO LÓPEZ, 
JUAN DE DIOS ROMERO PALOP, PEP RUIZ DE AGUIRRE, CAMILO A. ULLOA and HERIBERT VALERO LAPAZ: 
Measuring retail trade using card transactional data.
1922 MARIO ALLOZA and CARLOS SANZ: Jobs multipliers: evidence from a large fi scal stimulus in Spain.
1923  KATARZYNA BUDNIK, MASSIMILIANO AFFINITO, GAIA BARBIC, SAIFFEDINE BEN HADJ, ÉDOUARD CHRÉTIEN, 
HANS DEWACHTER, CLARA ISABEL GONZÁLEZ, JENNY HU, LAURI JANTUNEN, RAMONA JIMBOREAN, 
OTSO MANNINEN, RICARDO MARTINHO, JAVIER MENCÍA, ELENA MOUSARRI, LAURYNAS NARUŠEVIČIUS, 
GIULIO NICOLETTI, MICHAEL O’GRADY, SELCUK OZSAHIN, ANA REGINA PEREIRA, JAIRO RIVERA-ROZO, 
CONSTANTINOS TRIKOUPIS, FABRIZIO VENDITTI and SOFÍA VELASCO: The benefi ts and costs of adjusting bank 
capitalisation: evidence from Euro Area countries.
1924  MIGUEL ALMUNIA and DAVID LÓPEZ-RODRÍGUEZ: The elasticity of taxable income in Spain: 1999-2014.
1925 DANILO LEIVA-LEON and LORENZO DUCTOR: Fluctuations in global macro volatility.
1926  JEF BOECKX, MAARTEN DOSSCHE, ALESSANDRO GALESI, BORIS HOFMANN and GERT PEERSMAN:
Do SVARs with sign restrictions not identify unconventional monetary policy shocks?
1927  DANIEL DEJUÁN and JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Quality of enforcement and investment decisions. Firm-level 
evidence from Spain.
1928  MARIO IZQUIERDO, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and ELVIRA PRADES: Propagation of sector-specifi c shocks within 
Spain and other countries.
1929  MIGUEL CASARES, LUCA DEIDDA and JOSÉ E. GALDÓN-SÁNCHEZ: On fi nancial frictions and fi rm market power.
1930  MICHAEL FUNKE, DANILO LEIVA-LEON and ANDREW TSANG: Mapping China’s time-varying house price landscape.
1931  JORGE E. GALÁN and MATÍAS LAMAS: Beyond the LTV ratio: new macroprudential lessons from Spain.
1932  JACOPO TIMINI: Staying dry on Spanish wine: the rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement.
1933  TERESA SASTRE and LAURA HERAS RECUERO: Domestic and foreign investment in advanced economies. The role 
of industry integration.
1934  DANILO LEIVA-LEON, JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN and EVA ORTEGA: Exchange rate shocks and infl ation comovement 
in the euro area.
1935 FEDERICO TAGLIATI: Child labor under cash and in-kind transfers: evidence from rural Mexico.
1936 ALBERTO FUERTES: External adjustment with a common currency: the case of the euro area.
1937  LAURA HERAS RECUERO and ROBERTO PASCUAL GONZÁLEZ: Economic growth, institutional quality and fi nancial 
development in middle-income countries.
1938  SILVIA ALBRIZIO, SANGYUP CHOI, DAVIDE FURCERI and CHANSIK YOON: International Bank Lending Channel of 
Monetary Policy.
1939  MAR DELGADO-TÉLLEZ, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Outsourcing and public expenditure: an 
aggregate perspective with regional data.
1940  MYROSLAV PIDKUYKO: Heterogeneous spillovers of housing credit policy.
1941  LAURA ÁLVAREZ ROMÁN and MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA GÓMEZ: Modelling regional housing prices in Spain.
1942  STÉPHANE DÉES and ALESSANDRO GALESI: The Global Financial Cycle and US monetary policy
in an interconnected world.
1943 ANDRÉS EROSA and BEATRIZ GONZÁLEZ: Taxation and the life cycle of fi rms.
1944  MARIO ALLOZA, JESÚS GONZALO and CARLOS SANZ: Dynamic effects of persistent shocks.
1945  PABLO DE ANDRÉS, RICARDO GIMENO and RUTH MATEOS DE CABO: The gender gap in bank credit access.
1946  IRMA ALONSO and LUIS MOLINA: The SHERLOC: an EWS-based index of vulnerability for emerging economies.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
